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A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and 
Property Rights 
Margaret E. Johnson∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that the legal system should do more to address 
intimate partner violence and each party’s need for a home for several 
reasons. First, domestic violence is a leading cause of individual and 
family homelessness. Second, the struggle over rights to a shared home 
can increase the violence to which the woman is subjected. And third, a 
woman who decides to continue to live with the person who abused her 
receives little or no legal support, despite the evidence that this decision 
could most effectively reduce the violence. The legal system’s current 
failings result from its limited goals—achieving a narrow concept of 
short-term safety premised on physical separation in the home. This 
Article argues for creating a comprehensive theory that addresses the 
rights to a home when there is domestic violence by focusing on each 
party’s dignity, the importance of home and ending domestic violence, 
as opposed to merely “safety.” 
There are several laws that address the home when there is domestic 
violence. The civil protection order (CPO) laws are the most prevalent; 
they exist in all fifty states and Washington, D.C. While most offer a 
vacate remedy to exclude the perpetrator of abuse from the shared home, 
they do so with varying effectiveness and petitioner success rates. Also, 
very few provide any economic support to maintain the home or find a 
new home if respondent is not excluded. And all 51 jurisdictions 
provide very few options to support a woman’s choice to stay in the 
shared home with her abuser, despite her decision that it would best end 
the domestic violence. 
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Beyond these shortcomings, the CPO vacate provisions also clash 
with property law in problematic ways for the respondents. Thirty-four 
jurisdictions permit vacating a perpetrator from his home, despite being 
the sole owner of the property. And there is a trend of making these once-
temporary vacate orders permanent. This clash can make the legal 
system seem unfair to perpetrators, which can lower their rate of 
compliance with the CPO. As a result, perpetrators may increase their 
violence against women subjected to abuse. 
This Article proposes a renewed anti-domestic violence movement 
that is focused on the dignity of and greater home access for both parties. 
Such a movement could focus on expanding existing laws that would 
both promote dignity and end domestic violence while ensuring greater 
home access. For instance, one proposal is for more thorough court fact 
finding in making the vacate order that includes the abuse as well as 
each party’s risk of potential homelessness and the extent of their 
personhood interests in the home. Another proposal is to increase the 
number of home options for the parties by creating shelters for men who 
are abusive, more jurisdictions that require alternative housing through 
a CPO, and increased funding for low-barrier battered women shelters 
and transitional housing. 
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Judge Bruce S. Lamdin ordered Gordan Bisnath not to abuse, 
threaten or harass [Parbadee Ann Bisnath, Mr. Bisnath’s ex-wife with 
whom he still shared a home]. . . . [Judge Lamdin] directed the 48-year-old 
to complete an abuser intervention program. But when it came time to 
address the victim’s request that her abuser not be permitted to contact her 
or return to their home . . . the judge declined. “Where is he going to live?” 
Lamdin asked . . . .1 
“He’s making the home unsafe for her, so he’s the one who should have 
consequences. . . . That she and the children should be homeless because he’s 
breaking the law makes no sense.”2 
“When it comes down to a protective order, [w]ho owns the property has 
little or nothing to do with anything.”3 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Article, I examine intimate partner violence and 
determine that the legal system does not appropriately address all of 
the issues that are critical to supporting each party’s need for a 
home.4 As a result of this problem, and as demonstrated by the 
Bisnath case set forth above, domestic violence can increase, and the 
 
 1. Jennifer McMenamin, Judge’s action question again: After serving suspension for 
conduct, Balto. Co. jurist criticized for failing to issue routine protective order in domestic violence 
case, BALTIMORE SUN (October 22, 2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-10-
22/news/0810210094_1_domestic-violence-judge-lamdin. 
 2. Id. 
 3. A comment posted on the Baltimore Sun’s webpage in response to the Bisnath 
story. George-WNEC, Comment to Anyone Want to TRY to Defend Judge Lamdin?, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN TALK FORUM (Oct. 23, 2008, 8:04 AM), 
http://talk.baltimoresun.com/showthread.php?t=168277. 
 4. I will discuss abuse by men against women throughout this article even though 
there is clear evidence that women can abuse men and that abuse occurs in same-sex 
relationships as well. I have made this choice because I am focused on the most prevalent form 
of domestic violence, coercive controlling terrorism by a male intimate partner on a female, 
which involves the operation of power and control through the use of various forms of abuse. 
Joan B. Kelly & Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner 
Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476, 481–82 
(2008). I also make this decision based on the research that shows women subjected to male-
perpetrated domestic violence are by far the largest majority of domestic violence victims. See 
id.; Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet%28National%29.pdf (indicating 
that 85% of persons subjected to abuse are women). See also Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining 
Harm, Reimagining Remedies and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1107, 1110 n.4 (2009). I make this decision with concern of perpetuating stereotypes based 
on gender or domestic violence. See generally Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate 
Partner Abuse and the Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 51 (2013). 
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parties can become homeless. Our legal system does not do what it 
can to support and maintain each person’s dignity. This problem 
results from the legal system’s limited goals—achieving a narrow 
concept of safety premised on physical separation in the home. This 
Article argues for creating a comprehensive theory that addresses the 
rights to a home when there is domestic violence by focusing on 
each party’s dignity, the importance of home, and ending domestic 
violence, as opposed to “safety.” To explore this new theory, this 
Article discusses three scenarios that a woman subjected to abuse 
might choose when she shares the home with her partner who has 
abused her. First, she might choose to separate from her partner by 
excluding him from the shared home while she stays in it. Second, 
she might choose to separate from him by leaving the shared home 
and allow him to stay in it. Third, she might choose not to separate, 
but rather to continue the relationship and stay in the shared home. 
Currently, the laws addressing the home when there is domestic 
violence do not adequately address the following questions: What 
goals should govern disputes relating to a shared home, or the 
provision of a new home, when there is domestic violence? How 
should the courts decide who should stay in the shared home? What 
conditions should govern that party’s period of possession and the 
other party’s exclusion? How can the domestic violence system 
reconcile its laws with property law? If not permitted to stay or not 
interested in staying in the shared home, can there be another home 
for one of the parties? What conditions should govern the 
identification, relocation, and maintenance of the new home? How 
can the domestic violence movement work toward greater access to 
the creation of a system where there are homes without 
domestic violence? 
There are several laws that address rights to the home shared by a 
couple when there is domestic violence in the relationship. The civil 
protection order (CPO) laws are the most prevalent laws addressing 
domestic violence; they exist in all fifty states and Washington, D.C.5 
Although these laws vary, they are generally short-term solutions, 
and focus primarily on injunctive relief designed to address violent 
crimes committed by a person in particular forms of relationship with 
another.6 The available relief often includes a provision that enjoins 
 
 5. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 6. Id. 
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future violence by the abuser, the respondent in the action; an order 
for respondent to stay away from the person subjected to abuse, the 
petitioner in the action; and an order that the respondent not 
contact the petitioner.7 Other relief may include counseling, child 
custody, child support, and excluding respondent from the shared 
home, often called a “vacate” order.8 
CPO vacate provisions vary greatly. For those subjected to abuse, 
CPO laws could do more to ensure they have a home and all the 
benefits that come from having a home. For instance, only some 
states provide remedies that support the petitioner in maintaining 
her home or obtaining a new home, such as ordering respondent to 
contribute to rent, mortgage, and/or household expenses or to 
provide an alternative home.9 Such provisions are not available in 
every jurisdiction, and their remedies are not very comprehensive. In 
addition, the 51 jurisdictions provide very few options to support a 
woman’s choice to stay in the shared home with her abuser, despite 
her decision that it would best end the domestic violence.10 But 
research shows that when courts permit women to exert their 
agency, they are best able to address the domestic violence.11 
At the same time, the CPO vacate provisions clash with property 
law in problematic ways for the respondents. Thirty-four jurisdictions 
permit respondents to be vacated from their home, despite being the 
sole owners of the property.12 And there is a trend of making these 
once-temporary vacate orders permanent, as seen currently in New 
Jersey.13 This clash can make the legal system seem unfair to 
respondents, which can lower their rate of compliance with the 
CPO. As a result, respondents may increase their violence 
against petitioners.14 
 
 7. See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for 
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910–
1030 (1993). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 10. See infra Part II.D. 
 11. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1148 (citing Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the 
Restraining Order Process: Observations in a Court Advocacy Program, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 606, 615 (2000)). 
 12. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 13. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2529 (2012). 
 14. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic 
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1846 (2002). 
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The issue of the home in domestic violence law needs greater 
attention for several reasons. First, domestic violence is a leading 
cause of individual and family homelessness.15 Second, the struggle 
over rights to a shared home can increase the violence to which the 
woman is subjected.16 And third, a woman who decides to continue 
to share a home with the person who abused her receives little or no 
legal support, despite the evidence that this decision could most 
effectively reduce the violence.17 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I will analyze the goals 
that should guide our legal system when there is domestic violence 
and the parties share a home: ending domestic violence, supporting 
each party’s dignity, and affirming the importance of the home. Part 
II analyzes the current legal landscape of laws that governs the home 
when domestic violence occurs and examines its benefits and 
shortcomings. Part III presents a proposed way forward: expanding 
domestic violence advocates’ focus to include dignity as an advocacy 
strategy for new or expanded laws identifying or creating homes for 
persons experiencing or perpetrating domestic violence. 
I. THE GOALS OF ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SUPPORTING 
DIGNITY, AND AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF HOME 
As stated above, the legal system has limited goals in addressing 
domestic violence, namely achieving short-term safety through 
physical separation, including separation of the parties who might 
share a home. This vision of safety has resulted in laws and funding 
streams that do not always promote the safety of women subjected 
to domestic violence and do not always address the other important 
goals of ending domestic violence, supporting the dignity of 
individuals and utilizing the home to achieve both the cessation of 
domestic violence and supporting individuals’ dignity. 
A. Ending Domestic Violence 
The first goal for the legal system addressing the shared home 
when there is domestic violence should be to end domestic violence. 
Domestic violence continues to be a large social problem despite our 
 
 15. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 16. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 17. See infra Part II.D.3. 
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expansive legal systems’ attempts to curb it. The National Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence reports that one in every four women 
will experience domestic violence in her lifetime.18 An estimated 1.3 
million women are victims of physical assault by an intimate partner 
each year.19 The exercise of power and control is central to domestic 
violence.20 That power and control may be exercised in many ways, 
including physical violence, emotional abuse, or isolation.21 
Researchers have identified that effective responses to domestic 
violence include those that support or restore a victim’s right to 
“freedom, choice and autonomy.”22 When women can choose and 
control the options of how to address the domestic violence, 
women’s agency is promoted and this promotion can help decrease 
the risk of re-assault.23 Therefore, legal interventions like the CPO 
laws, which permit persons subjected to abuse to control their legal 
remedy by choosing how best to address the abuse, can have a 
positive impact on reducing domestic violence.24 Similarly, the ability 
to stay at a domestic violence shelter can positively affect women’s 
psychological health as well as decrease violence.25 
Recently, the domestic violence justice system has focused less on 
the agency of women subjected to abuse and generating multiple 
 
 18. NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 4. 
 19. Costs of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the United States, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL 
(March 2003), http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf. 
 20. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1126 (citing Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: 
Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. 
L. REV. 945, 958 (2004); Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate 
Partner Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743 (2005)). 
 21. Id. at 1115–24. 
 22. Id. at 1151 (citing Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on 
Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 30 
(2007)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Janice Grau et al., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and 
Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL. 13, 19, 21–25 (1984); Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection 
Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women?, 15 AM. 
J. FAM. L. 59, 67 (2001); Johnson, supra note 4, at 1128; Carol E. Jordan, Intimate Partner 
Violence and the Justice System, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1412, 1425 (2004); Judith 
McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner Violence: An 18 Month Study of 150 
Black, Hispanic and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 613, 617 (2000). But see Jordan, 
supra note 4, at 1425. 
 25. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 104–
07 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 1996) (discussing Tutty study of shelters). 
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options for them to address domestic violence and more on options 
increasing the criminal justice system responses to domestic violence 
focused on the state’s conception of women’s safety.26 The legal 
system has focused on supporting a person once subjected to abuse 
after the person is in a non-abusive relationship or has left that 
relationship, but only for a limited time. As scholars have noted, 
there is “[v]irtually no attention . . . paid to a survivor’s need to 
develop a support network beyond that available from short-term, 
system-based advocacy.”27 While separation of the two parties has 
been the main focus of achieving safety in the short-term—through 
mandatory arrests, no drop prosecutions, stay away and no vacate 
orders in civil protection orders, and the funding of shelters—the 
long-term approach to ending domestic violence and maintaining 
the end of domestic violence is less developed. 
Moreover, the separation-as-safety focus has resulted in the 
isolation of women. Women subjected to abuse who move to 
shelters or alternative homes in an effort to be physically separated 
from their abusive partners end up separated from their 
communities, support networks, neighborhoods, employment, and 
children’s schools. Few system provisions exist to support the woman 
who wishes to maintain her connection to her community.28 And 
connection to community is “vital to virtually all victims’ physical 
safety . . . and psychological recovery.”29 Accordingly, ending 
domestic violence in the long term, not just the short term, should 
be a goal of the legal system. 
B. Supporting Dignity 
In addition to ending domestic violence, the legal system should 
uphold the dignity of the two parties in an abusive relationship who 
share a home. Here, I borrow the definition of “dignity” used in 
philosophy, political philosophy, and constitutional law. Dignity is 
 
 26. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 106–35 (2012); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of 
Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 305–06 
(2011). 
 27. LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A 
SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH AND JUSTICE 104 
(2008). 
 28. Id. at 99. 
 29. Id. 
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the inherent nature that renders human beings capable of 
autonomous action and thought.30 Dignity recognizes human beings 
as separate from the state in determining fundamental questions 
affecting the meaning of their lives. John Stuart Mill explained that 
dignity exists in human beings simply because they have the capacity 
to “explore the unknown and to share their discoveries.”31 Similar to 
the Millian conception is the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and its preamble, which provide a “recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family. . . .”32 In U.S. constitutional law, the 
Supreme Court often discusses human dignity as related to personal 
autonomy or “the inviolability of persons from intrusions by the 
state.”33 The concept of human dignity often is equated with each 
individual’s inherent worth.34 And the Court often discusses dignity 
as essential to equality.35 In American political culture, as Ronald 
Dworkin explains, there “is a belief in individual human dignity: that 
people have the moral right—and the moral responsibility—to 
confront for themselves, answering to their own conscience and 
conviction, the most fundamental questions touching the meaning 
and value of their own lives.”36 
For human dignity, individuals must have both the opportunity 
and capacity to make these personal, fundamental decisions, but 
dignity is not contingent on whether individuals access the 
opportunity or how they exercise this capacity.37 Martha Nussbaum 
 
 30. Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity and Safety: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 545 (2010). 
 31. RONALD BONTEKOE, THE NATURE OF DIGNITY 31 (2008) (comparing the Millian 
view of dignity to the Kantian which posits that dignity exists in human beings because they 
have the capacity to recognize and act upon objective and ethical truths). 
 32. Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 12 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. 
Parent eds., 1992). 
 33. Judith Resnick & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of 
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1937 (2003). 
 34. Johnson, supra note 30, at 546 (citing Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity 
in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 215–18 (2008)). 
 35. Id. at 547; Neomi Rao, Gender, Race, and Individual Dignity: Evaluating Justice 
Ginsburg’s Equality Jurisprudence, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1053, 1059, 1080 (2009). 
 36. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 426 (1992). 
 37. Johnson, supra note 30, at 546–47 (citing Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of 
Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 215–18 (2008)). 
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argues that we should ground dignity, and measure our political and 
societal respect for it, not only in support of rationality but also of 
such capabilities as life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; 
respect for other species; play; and control over one’s environment.38 
In considering how dignity relates to intimate partner violence 
almost all of these areas of capabilities emerge. 
As discussed earlier, the legal system has robustly addressed ways 
for a woman subjected to abuse to separate from her abuser when 
they share a home. And these laws are critical both for women who 
want to leave the relationship but stay in the home, and for women 
who want to leave the relationship and the home. They address areas 
of capabilities such as bodily health and integrity, emotions, practical 
reason, affiliation and control over one’s environment. But they are 
not comprehensive enough in addressing these capabilities. There are 
virtually no laws that support a decision to stay in the relationship 
and the home but end the violence. And the legal system has not 
properly addressed the dignity of persons who abuse their intimate 
partners, despite evidence that such consideration could decrease the 
violence. This paper argues for dignity to be a guiding value for a 
more comprehensive legal system that addresses the home in 
domestic violence situations. 
C. Affirming the Importance of Home 
The third goal for the domestic violence legal system is affirming 
the importance of “home” because of its relationship to domestic 
violence. In addition, both property scholarship and domestic 
violence scholarship show the importance of home to a 
person’s dignity.39 
1. Home and domestic violence 
There is a tight relationship between home and domestic 
violence. The common law castle doctrine states that “in his home, a 
 
 38. Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in HUMAN DIGNITY 
AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 
(2008). 
 39. See, e.g., Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home”: A Re-Analysis of Gender, Homeownership 
and Debtor Default for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423, 428 
(2008). 
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man may forcefully defend himself, his family, and his property 
against harm by others.”40 This doctrine permitted self-governance 
of the home separate from the state. Related to this doctrine, the 
home, historically, was “the castle” where the male head of 
household could govern the inhabitants as he saw fit.41 As a result, if 
the head of the household inflicted physical or other forms of abuse 
in the home on his wife or children, the state was unable or 
unwilling to step in and enforce criminal laws.42 For many years, 
there was a sense that the home is, or should be, an inviolable place 
even if violence was being perpetrated by one family member 
against another.43 
Recognizing that domestic violence often occurs inside the 
family home and that women subjected to abuse should have the 
option to have a violence-free home, the early Battered Women’s 
Movement attempted to provide emergency, temporary homes by 
creating a network of private shelters.44 In addition, mandatory 
criminal laws of arrest and prosecution were created, which gave the 
state mandates to interfere in the home and separate the abuser from 
the woman subjected to abuse through jailing or criminal stay away 
 
 40. JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 56 (2009) (explaining that in property and criminal 
law, the “castle doctrine” has long regulated permissible behavior in response to home 
intrusion). 
 41. Id.; Fox, supra note 39, at 427. 
 42. Fox, supra note 39, at 437; Epstein, supra note 14, at 1850–51. 
 43. Such a sense was reinforced by Lawrence v. Texas, where the Supreme Court found 
criminal sodomy laws unconstitutional because people have a liberty interest in developing 
intimate relationships in the privacy of their home. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
See also SUK, supra note 40, at 128–131. For further discussion of Lawrence and its support for 
dignity, see Johnson, supra note 30, at 550. At the same time, there are exceptions in property 
law to this view that the home is a castle and thus off-limits from the state. For instance, in a 
case that does not involve domestic violence but rather eminent domain, Kelo v. City of New 
London, the Supreme Court ruled that New London could properly take the plaintiffs’ homes 
through the powers of eminent domain because repurposing them for other private ownership 
that would create economic development and generate tax revenue was a “public use.” Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). For a discussion of Kelo and its discussion of 
home, see SUK, supra note 40, at 89–96. 
 44. See generally SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS 
AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982). In Washington, D.C., a 
shelter stay typically lasts for twenty to thirty days. See SUPERIOR CT. OF THE DIST. OF 
COLUM., CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION PROGRAM, available at 
http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/CVCP_Brochure.pdf. This information is 
also based on my students’ clinical experiences in representing clients seeking civil protection 
orders and crisis shelter. 
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orders.45 And the Battered Women’s Movement created civil 
protection order laws that permitted persons subjected to abuse to 
temporarily vacate the abuser from the shared home.46 All of these 
interventions had the goal of immediate separation in the crisis and, 
through separation, a short-term reduction in the violence. 
Despite these vacate laws and this network of shelters, there is a 
strong connection between domestic violence and homelessness. The 
National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty reports that 
domestic violence is a leading cause of homelessness nationally.47 
One study in Massachusetts found that 92% of homeless women 
were survivors of physical or sexual assault at some point in their 
lives.48 These statistics help us understand that short-term, crisis 
solutions for staying in the home or establishing a new home need to 
be matched with long-term solutions to help maintain the home and 
an abuse-free life. In addition, the short-term solutions also need to 
expand in quantity and flexibility to accommodate more persons 
subjected to abuse. 
2. Dignity, home and property 
There is a strong connection between home and dignity. The 
connection begins with the historical relationship between dignity 
and property as seen in the legal institutions of slavery and coverture. 
Society’s lack of respect for the dignity of African Americans was 
demonstrated by the enacted slavery laws, transforming human 
beings into property until passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.49 
 
 45. GOODMARK supra note 26, at 107–13; G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: 
Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s 
Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 278–82 (2005) (analyzing mandatory interventions in the 
domestic violence legal system). 
 46. PETER FINN & SARA COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, 
CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT (March 1990); See infra Part II. 
 47. Program: Domestic Violence, NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, 
http://www.nlchp.org/program.cfm?prog=3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Un/re/dis Covering Slave Breeding in Thirteenth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 11, 13 (2001) 
(analyzing slave breeding); Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner’s Truth: Race, Gender, and the 
Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309, 313 (1996) (“The archetypes of the 
slave . . . were ideologies of womanhood that functioned not to simply describe reality, but to 
represent social relations in a way that legitimated and normalized racial and sexual 
domination.”). 
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Similarly, society’s lack of respect for married women’s dignity was 
demonstrated with the institution of coverture.50 Prior to the mid-
nineteenth century,51 although married women could hold title to 
the property, coverture dictated that only their husbands could 
exercise ownership rights, like the right to transfer, over the home.52 
If the property was jointly owned by the spouses as tenants by the 
entirety, the husband exclusively controlled the property.53 It took 
the passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts and the 
enforcement of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause to change these formal strictures on the 
relationship of women and property.54 
Even with these changes, dignity, property, and home are still 
interconnected.55 This interconnectedness exists in laws that 
distribute property based on the family unit or children, rather than 
individuals. For example, following a divorce, use and possession of 
the home is based in large part on the presence of children, and their 
need to maintain their community, not on the parents’ needs.56 This 
 
 50. Felice Batlan, Engendering Legal History, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 823, 830 
(2005); Ellen Dannin, Marriage and Law Reform: Lessons from the Nineteenth-Century 
Michigan Married Women’s Property Acts, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2010) (“By depriving 
women of the capacity to manage their property by the simple act of marriage, coverture 
deprived women of the status, livelihood, self-protection, and self-respect linked to property-
holding.”); Gwen Hoerr Jordan, Agents of (Incremental) Change: From Myra Bradwell to 
Hillary Clinton, 9 NEV. L.J. 580, 584, 590 (2009) (discussing how coverture rendered a 
married woman “civilly dead” and how it was similar to slavery). 
 51. See Dannin, supra note 50, at 3 (explaining how before the 19th century, a woman 
“lost control and, effectively, ownership of her personal and real property to a husband”); 
Jordan, supra note 50, at 590 (discussing how married women had no right to real or personal 
property pre-19th century). 
 52. Batlan, supra note 50, at 830; Dannin, supra note 50, at 4 (“Title to land remained 
in the wife, but the husband was entitled to manage or rent her land during the marriage and 
could retain any profits.”); Fox, supra note 39, at 429–30. 
 53. Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Haw. 1977); Johnson v. Leavitt, 125 S.E. 
490, 491 (N.C. 1924). 
 54. Id.; See also Dannin, supra note 50, at 5–7. 
 55. See generally Audrey McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, 
Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855 (2011). 
 56. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-206(1) (“[T]o enable any child of the 
family to continue to live in the environment and community that are familiar to the 
child . . . .”). See also MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-208(b)(1) (stating that the best interest 
of the child will be a factor in the determination); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d 
1052, 1058 (Md. 1980) (explaining that the court’s interests is to “ensure that when a 
marriage is dissolved, the interests of minor children in the family are given ‘particular and 
favorable attention’”); Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 496 A.2d 56, 62 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1985) 
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lack of recognition of the parents’ independent basis from their 
children for dignity echoes scholar Lorna Fox’s conception that the 
individual woman often becomes invisible as a home owner or 
occupier even while the family is highly visible.57 
While society has used property and home to devalue an 
individual’s dignity, people have used their homes to support and 
foster their dignity. Scholar bell hooks argues that for women of 
color, the home serves as a situs for individual resistance and dignity. 
bell hooks shows that for black women, and disadvantaged people 
more generally, the home has provided a respite from outside 
societal pressure and racism and also a situs for personal 
development.58 Historically, black women established their homes in 
resistance to white supremacy and domination.59 This is because 
“[a]n effective means of white subjugation of black people globally 
has been the perpetual construction of economic and social 
structures that deprive many folks of the means to make 
homeplace.”60 Specifically, hooks states that “[b]lack women resisted 
by making homes where all black people could strive to be subjects, 
not objects, where we could be affirmed in our minds and hearts 
despite poverty, hardship, and deprivation, where we could restore to 
ourselves the dignity denied us on the outside in the public world.”61 
hooks also argues that “houses belonged to women, were their 
special domain, not as property, but as places where all that truly 
mattered in life took place—the warmth and comfort of shelter, the 
feeding of our bodies, the nurturing of our souls. There we learned 
dignity, integrity of being; there we learned to have faith.”62 As seen 
in bell hooks’ work, persons who are subjected to subordination 
outside of home find a place of freedom and dignity inside 
the home. 
Similarly, Professor Margaret J. Radin’s personhood theory 
argues that female home ownership can come not from the financial 
 
(Divorce cases should yield to the “common law doctrine of parens patriae, the goal of which 
is to provide the child with a permanent home”). 
 57. Fox, supra note 39, at 440, 452–53. 
 58. Id. at 445, 447 (citing bell hooks, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL 
POLITICS 42 (1990)). 
 59. BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS 44 (1990). 
 60. Id. at 46. 
 61. Id. at 42. 
 62. Id. at 41–42. 
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connection or the family relationships but from the occupier’s 
individual attachment to and relationship with the property.63 As 
Radin states, the home “is the scene of one’s history and future, 
one’s life and growth. In other words, one embodies or constitutes 
oneself there. The home is affirmatively part of oneself—property for 
personhood—and not just the agreed-on locale for protection from 
outside interference.”64 Property rights that are related to 
personhood, Radin argues, should take precedence over property 
rights that are not personal.65 Accordingly, Radin argues that there 
should be a prima facie case that the right to personhood property 
should be protected against the government or fungible, non-
personal property claims.66 And if without this prima facie case, “the 
claimants’ opportunities to become fully developed persons in the 
context of our society would be destroyed or significantly lessened,” 
the case would be strongest.67 Radin’s personhood theory supports 
legal recognition of the connection between property and dignity. 
D. Ending Domestic Violence, Supporting Dignity, and Affirming the 
Importance of Home 
The connection between the three goals of ending domestic 
violence, supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of home 
is underscored by a recent study of low-income Puerto Rican women 
subjected to abuse. In this study, the young women often entered 
intimate partner relationships not out of love but for an immediate 
need for housing as they left their abusive childhood homes.68 But 
when those intimate relationships became abusive, “[h]ousing . . . 
became a valued resource and source of power when [they] wanted 
out of their abusive intimate relationships and into housing they 
controlled.”69 The women “transposed their housing dependencies 
from intimate partners to housing they control.”70 The study showed 
that these women found a source of power in their independent 
 
 63. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 992 (1982). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1013. 
 66. Id. at 1014–15. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Sherri Lawson Clark, et al., Housing Dependence and Intimate Relationships in the 
Lives of Low-Income Puerto Rican Mothers, 32 J. FAM. ISSUES 369 (2010). 
 69. Id. at 382. 
 70. Id. at 385. 
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housing and that, even when the home was shared with an intimate 
partner, the women maintained their control over the home by 
making their partners live in the shadows and not join in the lease.71 
The study also showed that “[m]others . . . interpreted housing as a 
valued resource in intimate partner relationships in divergent ways 
with independent housing being seen as a bargaining tool to 
maintain or initiate relationships as well as a refuge for terminating 
relationships that experienced conflict.”72 As the study found, 
“[h]aving control over housing made it easier for [the women] to 
endure tenuous relationships.”73 As can be seen in the study of 
Puerto Rican low-income women, the home is a determinative factor 
in ending violence. Women subjected to abuse may choose to 
control the relationship, or rearrange it in a way that the women 
maintain control and decrease their exposure to violence, by either 
living apart from the abuser or residing with him. And one’s home is 
a determinative factor in this rearrangement. 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL SYSTEM 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the goals of ending 
domestic violence, supporting each party’s dignity, and affirming the 
importance of home are critical for a legal system to properly address 
domestic violence when the parties live together. This Part will 
address the many laws that govern the use, possession, exclusion of 
and responsibility for the home when there is domestic violence. 
While some of the laws fit these goals, many of them do not and 
need reform. 
A. Three Categories of Laws 
I divide the laws that address the home when there is domestic 
violence into three categories: (1) those that permit the person 
subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home and exclude the 
abuser; (2) those that permit the person subjected to abuse to leave 
the shared home and obtain a new home; and (3) those that permit 
the person subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home with their 
partner but ending the domestic violence. 
 
 71. Id. at 388. 
 72. Id. at 385. 
 73. Id. at 386. 
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First, there are several laws that permit a person subjected to 
abuse to stay in the shared home and exclude the abuser: (1) civil 
protective order (CPO) laws that permit a petitioner, the person 
subjected to abuse, to obtain an order that excludes the respondent, 
the person abusing the other, from the home; (2) rental laws that 
permit a person subjected to abuse to defend against eviction and 
bifurcate the leasehold when the landlord seeks to evict the co-tenant 
abuser and the co-tenant victim for the violence committed; and (3) 
rental laws that permit a person subjected to abuse to require their 
landlord to change the locks to keep out excluded abusers. 
Second, there are also laws that permit those persons subjected 
to abuse to leave and identify a new home if they wish to do so: (1) 
CPO laws that permit courts to order respondent to provide to 
petitioner an alternative home (or the money for a new home); (2) 
rental laws that permit a person subjected to abuse to terminate her 
lease early so she can obtain a new home; and (3) anti-discrimination 
laws that protect a person subjected to abuse from discrimination in 
trying to obtain a new home (that may be rented or purchased) 
because she is a victim of domestic violence; and (4) laws funding 
domestic violence shelters and transitional housing. 
Third, the CPO’s remedy of a “no further abuse” order is the 
only civil law that specifically aids a person subjected to abuse who 
wants to end the violence but stay in the shared home with the 
person who caused the abuse. 
B. Petitioner Chooses to Stay in Home and Exclude Respondent 
As discussed above, the first category of laws are those that 
permit a person subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home and 
exclude the abuser. Where they exist, these laws provide support for 
dignity and the option for an individual subjected to abuse to keep 
her home and address the domestic violence. Her ability to choose 
to maintain the home and exclude the person perpetrating the abuse 
from it, however, varies by jurisdiction. 
1. CPO’s vacate provision, eviction defense and lock-change laws 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have CPO statutes.74 
Protective orders can offer immediate, short-term, and longer-term 
 
 74. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1131; see generally Klein & Orloff, supra note 7. 
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relief.75 The short-term relief is usually in the form of an emergency 
protective order (EPO)76 or a temporary protective order (TPO)77 
and can be granted after an ex-parte hearing. An EPO might last 
until the next business day and a TPO might last until notice is 
provided to the respondent and both parties appear at the final 
protective order hearing. The longer-term relief is in the form of a 
final CPO. Some states’ CPOs last only six months and others can be 
permanent.78 In this Article, I conducted a fifty-one jurisdiction 
survey (all fifty states and the District of Columbia) in order to 
explore the real property allocation permitted under CPO statutes. 
The CPO real property reallocation orders are often called “vacate” 
orders as they provide the petitioner the right to vacate, or exclude, 
the respondent from petitioner’s home during the length of the 
order.79 How the respondent is excluded, which respondents may be 
excluded, and from what types of homes the respondent may be 
excluded varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as 
discussed below. 
The second set of laws that permit the person subjected to abuse 
to stay in the home and exclude her abusive partner are those laws 
that permit a woman subjected to abuse to defend against a 
landlord’s eviction claim. In most residential leases, tenants breach 
the lease if a crime is committed on the premises. When there is 
domestic violence, landlords often evict not only the abusive tenant 
for a breach of lease but also the victim of violence.80 To remedy this 
unfair situation, eleven jurisdictions permit a tenant who is a victim 
 
 75. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1130. 
 76. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–504.1(a), (b) (West 2012) (authorizing 
court commissioner to issue an Interim Protective Order (Maryland’s EPO equivalent) ex parte 
when court clerk’s office is closed). 
 77. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–505(a) (West 2012) (authorizing court to 
issue a Temporary Protective Order ex parte). 
 78. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b–15(d) (West 2012) (protective orders may last 
up to one year, and can be extended if court deems an extension necessary) and MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506(k)(3) (West 2012) (permitting permanent FPO in certain 
circumstances). In Maryland, however, a permanent order may not include a vacate order. MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506(k)(2) (West 2012). 
 79. See e.g. ALA. CODE § 30–5–7(b)(7) (West 2012) (permitting court to remove and 
exclude respondent from home) and MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506(d)(4) (West 2012) 
(permitting court to vacate respondent from home under certain circumstances). 
 80. Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of 
Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377, 385 (2006). 
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of violence to defend against such an eviction.81 Five states permit 
the lease to be bifurcated so that only the abusive person is evicted 
and a new lease is created with the remaining tenant, the woman 
subjected to abuse.82 Similarly, under the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA), public housing agencies or Section 8 landlords cannot 
evict individuals or terminate their assistance based on incidents of 
actual or threatened domestic violence against them83 or based on 
criminal activity directly relating to such violence,84 unless the 
landlord demonstrates that the individual’s continued tenancy would 
pose an “actual and imminent threat” to other persons on the 
property.85 Section 8 landlords also are given the power to bifurcate 
a joint lease in order to evict the individual causing violence but 
retain the tenant who is the victim of domestic violence.86 In 
addition, as with other VAWA housing provisions, landlords must 
provide individuals with notice of these VAWA rights.87 
The third set of laws are the lock-change laws for renters. Ten 
states have laws that permit the tenant to change the locks on her 
apartment because of domestic violence and out of a concern that 
the abuser would have keys to old locks to the apartment.88 This 
 
 81. COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–42–402 (2011); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.01 (LexisNexis 
2012); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A, 562B.25A(3) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:506(D) 
(2012); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8–5A–05 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 504B.205 
(2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47–8–33(J) (LexisNexis 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449 (2011); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.31(D) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (LexisNexis 
2012); WIS. STAT. § 106.50 (2012); See also Anne C. Johnson, From House to Home: Creating 
A Right to Early Lease Termination for Domestic Violence Victims, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1859, 
1882, 1885 (2006). 
 82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-16-112(c)(3)(A)-(B) (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–31–9–
14 (West 2007); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227–c(2)(C)(II)(B) (McKinney 2012); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 90.456 (West 2012); WIS. STAT. § 704.16–19 (2008); NAT’L LAW CTR., 
THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE HOME: STATE LAWS THAT PROTECT HOUSING RIGHTS FOR 
SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2012) available at 
http://www.nlchp.org/Theres_No_Place_Like_Home. 
 83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(5), 1437f(c)(9)(B) (2006). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(k)(6), 1437f(c)(9)(C)(i) (2006). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(c)(3), 1437d(c)(5), 1437d(l)(6), 1437f(c)(9)(B), 
1437f(c)(9)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(l)(6), 1437f(c)(9)(C)(ii) (2006). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(u)(2)(B), 1437f(ee)(2)(B) (2006). 
 88. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33–1318 (LexisNexis 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18–16–112 
(2009); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.08 (LexisNexis 2001); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750 / 20 
(West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–31–9–10 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 
8–5A-06 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42.3 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.459 (2011); 
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provision provides extra security to a tenant who has vacated the 
respondent from the home. The state laws protect the landlords 
from possible claims of unlawful lock outs of the abusive tenant 
as well. 
2. Benefits 
These three sets of laws—CPO vacate provisions, eviction 
defense laws, and lock-change laws—provide a number of benefits to 
victims of abuse. In terms of the goal of ending domestic violence, 
the civil protection order’s vacate provision, when granted, does 
permit petitioner and respondent to be physically separated and thus 
creates a physical barrier to further physical abuse. This is also true of 
the lock-change provision, which requires landlords to change the 
locks to provide extra assurance that the respondent cannot re-enter 
the rented home. As stated above, research shows that when women 
choose the option of obtaining a CPO to address the domestic 
violence and successfully obtain one, their exposure to violence 
decreases.89 As to the goal of maintaining a home, the eviction 
defense laws preclude the landlord from evicting the person 
subjected to abuse from her home while evicting the abuser. In 
addition, the laws providing for bifurcation of the lease permit a 
tenant to create a sole tenancy while the landlord evicts the 
abusive partner. 
In terms of the value of dignity and the home, these laws permit 
the person subjected to abuse to stay in the shared home and create 
a place of development and expression of her individuality to support 
her dignity. She can stay in her community, which is where she is 
most likely connected to schools, employment, neighbors, and 
friends, and avoid the disruption of having to find a new place. In 
addition, if she chooses to end the relationship, the vacate order 
separating the parties respects her decision about rearranging her 
relationship with the respondent. And being able to stay in the 
shared home has the promise of keeping her from being homeless. 
There are some advantages for the respondent as well. Seventeen 
jurisdictions recognize respondent’s property interests and limit the 
courts’ ability to vacate respondents if the home is solely-owned by 
 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57–22–5.1 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.18:1 (2012); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.585 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 89. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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respondent. These jurisdictions often require that the respondent 
have a family obligation to the woman or their children in order for 
the court to vacate him from his solely-owned property.90 
3. Shortcomings 
Despite these benefits, there are many shortcomings both for the 
woman subjected to abuse and the perpetrator of the abuse. 
First, a petitioner may be unable to persuade a court to order 
respondent to vacate the home. The research shows that courts grant 
vacate orders at a low rate. Thirty-four out of fifty-one jurisdictions 
permit the court to exclude the respondent and/or grant possession 
of the residence to the petitioner, regardless of the title to the 
home.91 Yet courts’ concerns over the breadth of this property rights 
redistribution remedy may result in their reluctance to grant it. 
Moreover, if a woman has fled the home initially but then seeks to 
return to the home through the protective order, the court may 
 
 90. ALA. CODE § 30–5–7(c)(4) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. §19–13–4(a) (West 2012); 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19–A, § 4007 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93–21–15 (2008); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 173–B:4 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (West 2011); 23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20–4–60 (2012); and TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 83.006 (West 2011). Married: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3107 (West 2012); MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4–506 (West 2012) (also cohabitant of at least 90 days in last year); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.050 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.718 (West 2012); WIS. 
STAT. § 813.12(3) (2012) (or if not married, vacate for reasonable time only). Limited time: 
ARIZ. R. PROT. ORD. P., Rule 6 (Arizona 2012), WIS. STAT. § 813.12(3)(a)(2)(am)(2012); 
Marital Property: D.C. R. DOM. VIOLENCE, Rule 11 (2012). Duty to Support and Petitioner 
has custody of children: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2012). 
 91. ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9–15–205 (2012); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 6321 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1–1001 (2012); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 46b–15(c) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)(3) (West 2012); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §19–13–4(a) (West 2012); HAW. 
REV. STAT. §§ 586–4(a)(3), 586–5.5 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39–6306 (West 
2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 / 214 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 34–26–5–9 
(West 2012); IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (West 2012); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 
(West 2012); MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40–15–204 (2011); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.030 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:25–29 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–13–5 (2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 
842 (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14–
07.1–08 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3 (West 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 
15–15–3 (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25–10–5 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–7–
106 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060 (LexisNexis 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48–
27–403 (West 2012); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105 (2012). 
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refuse to vacate the respondent who had stayed in the home.92 In a 
recent study of 80 plaintiffs who requested respondents vacate the 
residence, the judges granted the request only six percent of the 
time.93 An earlier study showed that instead of vacating the 
respondent, judges told over seventy percent of petitioners to 
leave the home.94 In another earlier study of 175 cases in 
Kentucky, three judges granted orders to vacate 25% of the 
time.95 And another multi-state study showed that 32.4% of 
protection orders granted a permanent order to vacate the 
residence.96 These studies show that in many jurisdictions, a 
petitioner cannot rely on the court to issue a vacate order. 
The defense of eviction and lock-change laws are also a 
limited option for women subjected to abuse because the vast 
majority of jurisdictions do not have these laws. Only eleven 
jurisdictions have eviction defense and lock-change laws to 
protect private tenants.97 Therefore, women subjected to abuse 
 
 92. See email on file with author (petitioner counsel stating that this issue has risen 
multiple times in his jurisdiction). But see Swenson v. Swenson, 490 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1992) (reversing court’s refusal to vacate abuser from home). Also, a few 
jurisdictions’ laws specifically permit a petitioner to vacate a respondent even if the petitioner 
has left the home because of the abuse. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25–10–9 (2012); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36–3–613 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–253.4(F) (2012). 
 93. Valli Kalei Kanuha & Martha L. Ross, The Use of Temporary Restraining 
Orders (TROs) as a Strategy to Address Intimate Partner Violence, 19 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 343, 349 (2004). 
 94. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
163, 195–96 (1993). It is important to note that this study and others from the 1990s 
represent court decisions that pre-date more recent efforts to educate judges regarding 
the dynamics of domestic violence. 
 95. Janet Ford et al., Case Outcomes in Domestic Violence Court: Influence of 
Judges, 77 PSYCHOL. REP. 587, 590–92 (1995). 
 96. SUSAN L. KEILITZ, PAULA L. HANNAFORD & HILLERY S. EFKEMAN, CIVIL 
PROTECTION ORDERS: THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 65 (1997). The authors also note that the District of Columbia and Denver 
were more likely to grant such relief. Id. at 13, 29. 
 97. The eviction defense statutes are the following: COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–12–402 
(2011); D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.27A, 
562B.25A(3) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:506(D) (2013); MD. CODE ANN., REAL 
PROP. § 8–5A–05 (2013); MINN. STAT. § 504B.205 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47–8–33(J) 
(2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.449 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.31(D) (2013); WASH. 
REV. CODE§ 59.18.580 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 106.50 (2012). The states with bifurcation laws 
are Arkansas, Indiana, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin. 
The lock-change laws are the following: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1318 (2007); ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 18–16–112 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.08 (LexisNexis 2013); 765 ILL. 
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may also lose their apartments once rented, due to lease termination 
provisions that are triggered when violence or crimes occur on the 
premises. Moreover, landlords may attempt to evict women 
subjected to abuse along with the violent party in order to avoid 
creating a new lease with only the woman’s name, especially if she 
suffers from credit and financial issues.98 Public housing tenants and 
tenants using Section 8 vouchers are provided eviction protection 
under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).99 
For private tenants subjected to domestic violence, some 
states require landlords to change the locks if requested by the 
tenants. However, the tenants are required to bear the cost of the 
lock-change.100 Whether or not the landlords are required to 
change the locks, only eighteen jurisdictions explicitly provide 
tenants’ reimbursement for the lock-change under their crime 
victims’ compensation funds.101 
 
COMP. STAT. 750 / 20 (2007); IND. CODE § 32–31–9–10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., Real 
Prop. § 8–5A–06 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42.3 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.459 
(2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57–22-5.1 (LexisNexis 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 55–248.18:1 
(2013); WASH. REV. CODE§ 59.18.585 (2004). 
 98. Lapidus, supra note 80, at 385. 
 99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(c)(9)(B), (d)(1)(B), (o)(7)(C), (o)(20) (2006) (these 
provisions offer protection from eviction). Id. §§ 1437d(l)(6)(B), f(o)(7)(D) (these laws offer 
bifurcation of the lease). 
 100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33–1318 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18–16–112 (2012); 
D.C. CODE § 42–3505.08 (LexisNexis 2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–42.3 (2013); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 90.459 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57–22–5.1 (LexisNexis 2013); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 59.18.585 (2012). Some states explicitly allow landlords to charge fees. 765 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 750 / 20 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 8–5A–06 (West 2010); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 55–248.18:1 (2013). 
 101. ALASKA STAT. § 18.67.010 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–90–706 (2012); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 24-4.1–101 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9006 (2013); D.C. CODE § 4–
507 (2013); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 45 / 10.1 (2013); IOWA CODE § 915.86 (2011); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 258C, § 3 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 611A.57 (1993); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99–
41–5 (2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.090 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B–9 (West 2007); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B–7 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M–7–511 (West 2013); VT. STAT. 
tit. 13, § 5356 (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–368.11:1 (2013). See also Compensation, 
ALASKA DEP’T OF ADMIN., http://doa.alaska.gov/vccb/Victims/compensation.html (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2013); Crime Victim Compensation Program, DENVER DIST. ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE, http://www.denverda.org/DA_Programs/victim_info/victim_compensation.htm 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013); Compensation Program, DEL. VICTIMS’ COMP. ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/VCAP/compensation.htm (last visited Nov. 
7, 2013); Crime Victim Compensation: Frequently Asked Questions, OFFICE OF THE ILL. 
ATTORNEY GEN., http://www.ag.state.il.us/victims/CV_FAQ_0113.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 
2013); Emergency Fund, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ojp/help-for-crime-victims/Pages/emergency-fund.aspx (last 
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Another shortcoming of CPO vacate laws is that even if a 
petitioner can get a CPO against the respondent that limits 
respondent’s access to the home, many of the laws do not permit 
the court to deprive respondent of all of his property rights during 
the life of the CPO.102 The respondent may use his remaining 
rights in the property to continue to use the home to abuse 
petitioner. Some states provide for the respondent to be excluded 
or vacated from the home, thereby removing the respondent’s 
possessory interests, but do not explicitly provide for the court to 
order him to stay away from the home.103 Some jurisdictions only 
permit the court to order respondent to stay away from the home 
and do not also allow the court to remove his right to possession or 
even require that he vacate himself and his belongings.104 The 
problem with these inconsistencies is that it is possible that the laws 
would still permit respondent access to the home, or at least the 
ability to use the home, to perpetrate some abuse of and control 
over petitioner. Either result would not further the goal of ending 
domestic violence through the woman’s control of her home. For 
example, if the law does not provide petitioner with exclusive 
possession of the home, respondent will maintain the possessory 
rights he had prior to the CPO. If he was ordered to stay away only 
and there was no grant of exclusive possession to petitioner, while 
respondent could not enter the premises and take possession due to 
 
visited Nov. 7, 2013); Application for Victim of Crime Compensation, STATE OF NEV. VICTIMS 
OF CRIME PROGRAM, http://voc.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/vocnvgov/content/VOC/
VOCP_Application-English.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013); Benefits in a Nutshell, N.J. OFFICE 
OF ATTORNEY GEN., http://www.nj.gov/oag/njvictims/benefits.html (last visited Nov. 7, 
2013); How much can be paid?, N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, 
https://www.nccrimecontrol.org/Index2.cfm?a=000003,002144,000016,000162,000166 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013); SUPERIOR COURT OF THE D.C., supra note 44; Are You a Victim 
of a Crime, UTAH OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
http://www.crimevictim.state.ut.us/Documents/Crime%20Victim%20Information/CrimeVic
timBrochure_2011.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 102. See infra notes 103–04. 
 103. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9–15–205 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1–1001 
(2013); FLA. STAT. § 741.30 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3107 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 209A, § 3 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B–3 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14–07.1-02 
(2013); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6108 (2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15–15–3 (2013); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 25–10–5 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–606 (2013). 
 104. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18–1–1001 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 586–
4(a)(3), -5.5 (2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.750 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
600.2950 (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (2012); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 
2013); W. VA. CODE § 48–27–503 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4)(a) (2012). 
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the stay away, he could transfer his possessory rights to another.105 
With his possessory rights, respondent could continue his exercise 
of power and control by creating an involuntary roommate for 
the woman. 
The third disadvantage is that states do not offer adequate 
options for a woman to economically maintain the shared home if 
she chooses to exclude her abuser. Only New Jersey and Missouri 
provide specifically for respondent to pay his share of the rent or the 
mortgage for the home once he is vacated.106 It is possible that 
courts could order respondent to pay rent, the mortgage, or other 
household expenses under a “catch-all” remedy, but such a remedy is 
not available in every jurisdiction.107 In addition, only two states 
restrain the respondent from cancelling utilities during the life of the 
CPO,108 and only three jurisdictions preclude the parties from 
transferring, encumbering, or disposing of the home during the life 
of the CPO.109 Accordingly, if a woman is able to successfully vacate 
the respondent, in most cases, petitioner is left to pay for the 
mortgage, rent, and the household expenses with only her one 
income, if she even has that, and this may make the living situation 
untenable for her. 
Yet, even if petitioner is awarded the vacate order, awarded the 
lock-change, and/or defended against eviction, physically excluding 
respondent from the home is not always the solution to ending the 
domestic violence. In fact, the separation itself can increase the 
violence.110 Research has shown that for certain women, separation 
may heighten the violence.111 For instance, one study showed that 
“‘wives are much more likely to be slain by their husbands when 
 
 105. This situation happened in a recent Georgetown University Law Center clinic case. 
It should be noted that in a few jurisdictions, the law specifically permits the court to order 
respondent not to transfer the property. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (2012); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 83.006 (West 2013); W. VA. CODE § 48-27-403 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
35-21-105 (2013). 
 106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 455.050 (2012). 
 107. Klein & Orloff, supra note 7, at 912. 
 108. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–3107 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 (2013). 
 109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20–4–60 (2012); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 83.006 (West 2013); 
W. VA. CODE § 48–27–403 (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105 (2013). 
 110. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1127–28 (citing LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED 
WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 55 
(1994)). 
 111. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 97–98. 
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separated from them than when co-residing.’”112 Options beyond 
physical separation need to be created to more thoroughly address 
the societal epidemic of domestic violence.113 
For the respondents, the CPO vacate provision, eviction defense, 
and lock-change laws have many shortcomings as well. Several 
shortcomings reflect the dissonance between vacate orders and 
property law. These CPO vacate provisions and lock-change laws 
infringe upon a respondent’s property rights. And because a 
respondent can be vacated from his solely-owned property in thirty-
four jurisdictions, even if not married to the petitioner, the law may 
seem unjust from the perspective of the property holder. 
In fact, as discussed in more detail below, this seeming injustice 
can also negatively impact petitioners as well, as it can reduce the 
chance that respondent will comply with the CPO. In addition, 
legislators have shown reluctance to expand relief under civil 
protection orders because of their perception that vacate provisions 
are unjust.114 
Previously, respondents have been unsuccessful in arguing that 
the vacate orders are an unconstitutional taking without just 
compensation.115 Because the vacate order does not disturb the 
respondent’s title and is temporary in nature, courts have, to date, 
found the vacate order constitutional.116 As discussed earlier, thirty-
four jurisdictions permit the petitioner to exclude the respondent in 
some manner from the home even if the petitioner is not on the 
 
 112. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence 
as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women¸ 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 349 (2009) 
(citing Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE 
& VICTIMS 3, 8 (1993)). 
 113. Id. at 348–49. In the United States, more than three women a day are murdered by 
an intimate partner, and nearly one in four women will experience violence by a partner in her 
life. See Get the Facts: The Facts on Domestic, Dating and Sexual Violence, FUTURES WITHOUT 
VIOLENCE, www.futureswithoutviolence.org/content/action_center/detail/754 (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2013); Domestic Violence: Statistics and Facts, SAFE HORIZON, 
http://www.safehorizon.org/index/what-we-do-2/domestic-violence-abuse-53/domestic-
violence-the-facts-195.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
 114. This is based on the author’s own personal observations of legislative hearings on 
CPO laws. 
 115. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (applicable to states). 
 116. See State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 236 (Mo. 1982); Boyle v. 
Boyle, 12 Pa. D. & C. 3d 767, 773 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). 
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deed or lease.117 This means that respondent could lose the right to 
possess, occupy, include, or exclude persons from the home during 
the period he is vacated without any compensation. While it remains 
true that most jurisdictions’ CPO vacate provisions last for a limited 
time, it is also true that in some jurisdictions the CPO is longer. For 
instance, in New Jersey the CPO permits courts to enter permanent 
orders of exclusive possession to the plaintiff, regardless of ownership 
interests in the home.118 Although the New Jersey statute also makes 
clear, as do twelve other jurisdictions, that the CPO has no effect on 
the title to the home, a permanent CPO with exclusive possession 
granted to plaintiff means respondent cannot exercise many of the 
rights of property ownership for the life of the CPO, which may be 
equal to petitioner’s life. Therefore, petitioner could exclusively 
possess the respondent’s home for the petitioner’s life. Because 
permanent CPOs have not been challenged under the due process 
arguments made to short-term TPO and CPO laws, it is a question 
of whether such permanent deprivation of many of the indicia of 
property ownership would no longer constitute a taking.119 
The laws in the other seventeen jurisdictions permit a vacate 
order when respondent is the sole owner only under circumstances 
where respondent is in a familial relationship with petitioner, such as 
a spouse or parent of a child-in-common. Those laws seem less 
unjust to respondent because they fit into the existing legal 
landscape of marital property and family law’s duty of spousal or 
child support.120 
 
 117. See supra note 91. 
 118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2013). 
 119. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) 
(finding a taking, requiring just compensation, when a permanent physical occupation of an 
owner’s property is authorized by the government). 
 120. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 375 (2001); 
KATHARINE K. BAKER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, FAMILY LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 91 (2009); 
RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 38 (2000). In 
addition to the duty of support, each spouse owes the other a duty of services as well. Id. See 
also Judd v. Meszaroz, 2011 WL 4489049, at *7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2011) 
(explaining that the statute has restrictions on vacating property, such that it can only be 
granted if the respondent has a duty to support the petitioner or other household members, 
and that the ruling does not impact title); Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 775 A.2d 
1249, 1257–58 (Md. 2001) (explaining that to grant a vacate order, judges must consider 
“factors set forth in § 4-506(e),” which provides “a certain balance” between “protection of 
persons who have been subjected to abuse” and “plac[ing] some limits on the right to the 
relief allowed”). 
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A second shortcoming of vacate laws for respondents is they do 
not fit well with common law property principles of co-ownership. 
In property law, when there are co-owners, they have an equal right 
to possess the property.121 If one co-owner excludes the other co-
owner, she could commit an ouster that would require the 
possessing co-owner to pay rent to the out-of-possession co-
owner.122 If there is an ouster, the occupying co-owner owes rent to 
the excluded co-owner.123 Ouster law anticipates only back rent or 
re-entry and possession of the ousted party as the remedy.124 Ouster 
law does not recognize excluding from possession the ousting party. 
Under the vacate laws, the petitioner has a court order effectively 
ousting the respondent, but the order does not alter respondents’ 
rent or mortgage obligations, and the order does not require 
petitioner to pay respondent back rent. 
A third shortcoming of vacate laws is that courts can grant a 
mere cohabitant—someone without a legal, familial relationship to 
the respondent—a vacate order against a respondent. For example, 
in Maryland, if the petitioner has been cohabitating with the 
respondent in his solely-owned home for at least ninety days, she can 
vacate respondent from his home through the CPO.125 This is starkly 
different from property law, which in general does not recognize 
property rights of possession, use, or inclusion for cohabitating, 
unmarried non-titled possessors of property. An exception is that in a 
few jurisdictions, when a long-standing couple shares a home owned 
by one of them where the title-holder had promised to convey joint 
 
 121. SINGER, supra note 120, at 348; see generally Gabay v. Bender, 823 N.Y.S.2d 389, 
390 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“Any co-owner of real property has the right to enter upon the 
common estate and take possession of the whole thereof, subject only to the equal right of co-
owners in interest with whose possession he or she may not interfere.”); Pettus v. Atchafalaya 
Wildlife Protective Soc’y., 351 So. 2d 790, 793 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“The right of a co-owner 
to use and possess property held in common is equal to that of other co-owners.”). 
 122. SINGER, supra note 120, at 351. As explained by Singer, “An ouster can be 
accomplished only by such conduct as is sufficient both to exclude the non-occupying 
tenant(s) and to communicate to them an intent to do so. Mere occupation of property by one 
of several owners is not sufficient to communicate an intent to oust the others.” Id. It is 
important to note that certain states codified laws that prohibited one spouse ousting another 
spouse. See SUK, supra note 40, at 21–25. 
 123. SINGER, supra note 120. 
 124. Id. 
 125. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4–501(d)–(m) (LexisNexis 2013). 
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title, but had not, the non-owner does acquire an ownership 
interests in the home at the end of the relationship.126 
As a result of dissonance between property and vacate laws, 
respondents and courts, among others, often view the civil protective 
order legal system as lacking fairness when it permits respondent to 
be vacated from his home that is solely-owned and non-marital 
property. The Bisnath case cited at the beginning of this Article 
demonstrates this principle. There, the court found that respondent 
had abused petitioner and granted all of the relief in the petition 
except the request for a vacate order. The court stated, “Where is he 
going to live?”127 
As Professor Deborah Epstein has explained, the social 
psychology of authority shows that “[t]he likelihood of a person’s 
compliance with . . . court orders . . . is at least as firmly rooted in his 
perception of fair process as in his satisfaction with the ultimate 
result.”128 According to Epstein, a fair system “enhances a person’s 
sense that authorities are moral and legitimate. This perception 
facilitates a person’s sense of self-worth and, in turn, his degree of 
compliance, even when this conflicts with immediate self-interest.”129 
Criminological theory about dignity supports this procedural justice 
theory. Specifically, Epstein cites that “John Braithwaite’s shaming 
theory holds that sanctions imposed in a manner that harms a 
person’s dignity may result in an increase in future offending. 
Conversely, sanctions imposed in a respectful manner that honors 
human dignity may increase compliance with authority.”130 
Under Professor Tom Tyler’s theory of procedural justice, there 
are four factors that contribute to judgments that a process, such as a 
court proceeding, is fair: (1) “opportunities for participation 
 
 126. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 111 (Cal. 1976); W. States Constr., Inc. v. 
Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Nev. 1992); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 
(N.J. 1979) (citing positively to Marvin); McKechnie v. Berg, 667 N.W.2d 628, 631–33 
(N.D. 2003); see also Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1373–74 (Mass. 1989) (creating a 
constructive trust in order to avoid unjust enrichment to the promisor); Porter v. Zuromski, 6 
A.3d 372 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (distributing cohabiters’ property based on unjust 
enrichment). 
 127. Jennifer McMenamin, Judge’s Action Question Again, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 22, 
2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-10-22/news/0810210094_1_domestic-
violence-judge-lamdin. 
 128. Epstein, supra note 14, at 1846. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1877. 
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(voice),” (2) “the neutrality of the forum,” (3) “the trustworthiness 
of the authorities,” and (4) “the degree to which people receive 
treatment with dignity and respect.”131 A study of police interactions 
with men who had committed domestic violence found that if they 
felt they were fairly treated during their interaction with the police 
the men complied with the law in the future. The study also found 
that perceptions of fairness were more important for future 
compliance than any police punishment (such as arrest or fines).132 
A respondent may view the CPO legal system as lacking fairness 
when it permits him to be vacated from his home that is solely-
owned, non-marital property. In those jurisdictions where the court 
provides no opportunity to explain one’s attachment to the home, 
whether one has alternative living arrangements if vacated from the 
home, or other important and relevant facts, the court does not 
provide respondent a voice in shaping the outcome of the vacate 
order, and the respondent could perceive that he is not being treated 
with dignity and respect. As a result, a respondent may feel that the 
process is not fair and he will not comply with the resulting order. 
The value of ending domestic violence may be undermined by 
respondents’ noncompliance in the long-term. 
A fourth shortcoming is that if a vacate order is granted, the 
respondents are left looking for a new home. And yet there are no 
shelters for men who abuse in the United States. Interestingly, there 
is a shelter for abusive men in Israel called Beit Noam.133 It is a live-
in treatment center for abusive men that has good results in reducing 
future violence.134 Beit Noam boasts a zero recidivist rate of 
domestic abuse, as compared to the twenty-five percent rate for 
batterer intervention programs in the United States, none of which 
may be properly classified as shelters.135 
 
 131. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND 
SOCIETY 435, 445 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). 
 132. Id. at 440 (citing Paternoster, Brame, Bachman, and Sherman, 1997). 
 133. Lora Bex Lempert, Shelters: For Abused Women, or Abusive Men? As Aids to Survival, 
or as Rehabilitation Sites?, 57 AGENDA 89, 98 (2003); Ophra Keynan et al., Beit Noam: 
Residential Program for Violent Men, 7 J. AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & TRAUMA 207, 
208–09 (2003). 
 134. Lempert, supra note 128, at 98; Keynan et al., supra note 128, at 234 (showing 
reductions in physical violence in short-term but needing long-range study to determine 
effectiveness in long-term). 
 135. Lempert, supra note 128, at 98; Keynan et al., supra note 128, at 233. See also Eric 
S. Makowski et al., Collateral Damage: An Analysis of the Achievements and Unintended 
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Due to this lack of shelters for men who abuse, a perpetrator of 
domestic violence may be separated from the person whom he had 
abused, but his now-unstable living situation may nonetheless 
negatively affect his former partner and any children. He may be 
reliant on his community to support his new home or he may be 
forced to rely on the homeless shelter system, which is underfunded 
and under-resourced.136 If the couple has children in common, the 
lack of a more permanent home may make it difficult for the father 
to maintain his involvement in the children’s life, through custody or 
visitation.137 The lack of a home also may create obstacles to 
maintaining employment, which in turn may affect financial support 
of the children and maintenance of the shared home and 
household expenses.138 
A potential disadvantage of the eviction defense laws for persons 
who perpetrate domestic abuse is that those laws often do not permit 
a bifurcation of the lease, in which the evicted perpetrator would be 
 
Consequences of Batterer Intervention Programs and Discourse, 17 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 167 
(2002). 
 136. See Holly S. Schindler & Rebekah L. Coley, A Qualitative Study of Homeless Fathers: 
Exploring Parenting and Gender Role Transitions, 56 FAM. REL. 40, 41, 48–49 (2007) 
(explaining various strains that homeless fathers face). 
 137. See Rebecca Licavoli Adams, California Eviction Protections for Victims of Domestic 
Violence: Additional Protections or Additional Problems?, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 
1, 15, 22 (2012) (explaining that “financial abuse is a common type of domestic violence so 
victims may also have trouble securing housing,” and even when housing is secured, women 
and children may be evicted when the father shows up for visitation); Shirley Darby Howell, 
Domestic Violence, Flawed Interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(l)(6), Sexual Harassment in 
Public Housing, and Municipal Violations of the Eighth Amendment: Making Women Homeless 
and Keeping Them Homeless, 13 T.G. JONES L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2008) (explaining that at least 
“fifty percent of homeless women became homeless as a direct result of domestic abuse,” many 
of whom have children and now live on the streets). 
 138. Anne R. Roschelle, Welfare Indignities: Homeless Women, Domestic Violence, and 
Welfare Reform in San Francisco, 25 GENDER ISSUES 193, 194, 202 (2008) (explaining that 
abusive men “sabotage women’s training and employment responsibilities;” barriers to 
employment are exacerbated by the exigencies of homelessness, especially for “homeless 
women who are also victims of domestic violence” for whom “barriers can become 
insurmountable”); Stephanie Riger, Sheela Raja & Jennifer Camacho, The Radiating Impact of 
Intimate Partner Violence, 17 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 184, 200 (2002) (“Women with 
children who do not have family support or access to affordable child care may find it 
particularly difficult to establish themselves financially and vocationally.”); Pamela H. 
Zappardino & Deborah DeBare, In Search of Safety: Double Jeopardy for Battered Women, 8 
NEW ENG. J. OF PUB. POL., 753, 757 (1992) (“Child custody issues inevitably complicate the 
situation for a battered woman who has left her home.”). 
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removed from the lease and attendant obligations.139 If the lease is 
not bifurcated, but the perpetrator of abuse is evicted from the 
rented home while the victim of the abuse remains, the perpetrator 
may continue to be liable for any default by the possessing victim, 
such as rent or damage to the property. 
C. Petitioner Chooses to Leave Home and Respondent Stays in Home 
There are four sets of laws addressing the scenario in which a 
woman subjected to abuse chooses to leave the shared home to look 
for a new home, while the respondent remains. 
1. CPO alternative housing provision, early lease termination, anti-
discrimination, and shelter and transitional housing funding laws 
Under certain CPO laws, the court may order a respondent to 
provide petitioner with new housing as an alternative to staying in 
the shared home.140 In addition, certain rental laws permit persons 
subjected to abuse to terminate their lease early without penalty to 
allow them to move away from their abuser.141 Anti-discrimination 
laws protect domestic violence victims who are seeking to rent an 
apartment or purchase a home with a mortgage.142 And finally, 
 
 139. See NATIONAL LAW CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, THERE’S NO PLACE 
LIKE HOME: STATE LAWS THAT PROTECT HOUSING RIGHTS FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC 
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 33, http://www.nlchp.org/Theres_No_Place_Like_Home (last 
visited 11/1/2013). 
 140. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 / 214 (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2012); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 19–13–4(a) (2012); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 93–21–15 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–13–5 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B–3 
(2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–606 
(West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 (2012); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105 
(2012). 
 141. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33–1318 (LexisNexis 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–12–
402(2) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.07 
(LexisNexis 2012); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750 / 15 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 32–31–9–12 (LexisNexis 2012); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8–5A–02 
(LexisNexis 2012); MINN. STAT. § 504B–205 (2007); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227–c 
(Consol. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–45.1 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2011); TEX. 
PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (LexisNexis 
2012); and WIS. STAT. § 704.16 (2012). See also Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
14043e–1 (2012). 
 142. LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: HOUSING PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIMS OF 
DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND STALKING (2010), available at 
http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/housing-1.pdf (identifying eight jurisdictions 
and Westchester County, NY as having anti-discrimination laws protecting domestic violence 
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various funding laws for shelters and transitional housing assist 
women subjected to abuse with limited economic means to 
nonetheless find a new temporary home.143 
A woman subjected to abuse may seek a new home to create her 
personhood interest, develop her personal identity, or form strong 
community bonds. Sometimes a woman seeks a new home not 
because she wants to leave the shared home but because under the 
laws of her jurisdiction or as a result of the high rate of denial of a 
vacate request she was unable to exclude the respondent from the 
shared home.144 If she was denied a vacate order, but wants to 
 
victims). It is important to note that under the Federal Fair Housing Act, landlords, sellers of 
real estate, and mortgagees are unable to discriminate on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3606. Discrimination against women subjected to domestic violence can be illegal sex 
discrimination when even neutral housing policies have a disproportionate effect on women. 
Lapidus, supra note 80, at 380 (citing Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., ex rel. 
Alvera v. C.B.M. Group Inc., HUD ALJ No. 10-99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban 
Dev., Portland, Or., Apr. 16, 2001)). Ms. Alvera’s landlord gave Ms. Alvera 24-hour notice of 
eviction because she had been assaulted by her husband. The eviction was based on the 
landlord’s policy of evicting “‘tenants who pose a threat to the safety and well-being of other 
tenants in the complex. When one person in the household poses a threat, the entire 
household is evicted.’” Id. at 379 (citing Alvera v. Creekside Village Apts., HUD ALJ No. 10-
99-0538-8 (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Portland, Or., Oct. 22, 1999)). Under the 
Fair Housing Law, landlords cannot reject rental applications because an applicant has 
experienced domestic violence in the past, cannot enforce any rules against tenants 
experiencing domestic violence that do not apply to other tenants, and cannot evict domestic 
violence victims on account of domestic violence. Meris L. Bergquist, Esq., After the Violence: 
Using Fair Housing Laws to Keep Women and Children Safe at Home, 34-SPG VT. B.J. 46 
(2008); AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, KNOW YOUR HOUSING RIGHTS: FOR SURVIVORS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/know-your-
housing-rights-survivors-domestic-violence; AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS IN PUBLIC AND SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (2008), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/womensrights/subsidized_housing_2008.pdf. 
 143. For FY2011, President Obama requested $649.36 million for violence against 
women programs. Twenty-five million dollars were for Transitional Housing Assistance grants 
through the Department of Justice and $140 million were for Family Violence 
Prevention/Grants for Battered Women’s Shelters administered by HHS. GARRINE P. LANEY, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: HISTORY AND 
FEDERAL FUNDING 2 (2010). The Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, P.L. 108-
36, and the PROTECT Act, P.L. 108–21, also authorized funds for HHS and DOJ 
transitional housing assistance programs for victims of domestic violence. Id. For FY2011 
funding, the President requested $25 million for DOJ’s transitional housing assistance 
program. Id. at 4. The 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $210 million for 
STOP grants, which included $18 million for transitional housing assistance grants. Id. at 
CRS-14 n.b. The Transitional Housing for Victims of Domestic Violence authorization, 
administered by HHS, expired after FY2008. This HHS program never received 
appropriations. Id. at CRS-15 n.j. 
 144. See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
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separate, then she must find a new home. Of course, there are 
reasons why a woman may prefer this option, for example if she feels 
that it is the best option for her in regards to her safety or other 
issues. She may want a home with an address unknown to 
respondent. An early lease termination law, for example, would 
permit the tenant to break her lease and move, undetected by her 
former abusive partner, to a new undisclosed location. 
2. Benefits 
There are several important benefits to these laws. All of these 
laws facilitate the agency of a person subjected to abuse by offering 
short-term alternative homes. As noted earlier, buttressing a 
woman’s agency can result in decreased violence.145 Moreover, 
physical separation may decrease violence, although the research also 
shows that separation can have the opposite effect in 
certain circumstances. 
These laws remove barriers to obtaining long-term homes. For 
example, anti-discrimination laws generally prevent landlords from 
rejecting rental applicants on the basis that the potential tenant was a 
petitioner in a CPO case, even if the landlord fears that such 
applicants may enter into violent relationships in the future and that 
violence would disrupt other tenants.146 These laws also protect 
domestic violence victims, who, as applicants for mortgages, 
sometimes are seen as risky debtors and unlikely to repay mortgage 
loans. These laws prohibit mortgagees from refusing to loan money 
because the applicant was or is a victim of domestic violence. 
Accordingly, laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
experience with domestic violence support women’s efforts to move 
to a new home. These anti-discrimination laws recognize the dignity 
of persons and refuse to let it be overshadowed by an individual’s 
subjugation to intimate partner violence. 
Laws that assist victims who seek new homes also benefit 
respondents. If a victim of violence is able to find a new home, the 
respondent is more likely to be able to remain in the shared home, 
 
 145. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 146. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14043 (2012). In addition, eight states 
have specific fair housing acts protecting victims of domestic violence. See LEGAL MOMENTUM, 
supra note 142 (identifying eight jurisdictions and Westchester County, NY, as having anti-
discrimination laws protecting domestic violence victims); Lapidus, supra note 80, at 384. 
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with the attendant benefits of maintaining his place of identity 
development and connection to his community. In addition, a very 
tangible benefit is that he will not be homeless provided he can 
afford maintaining the home. 
3. Shortcomings 
The laws addressing women subjected to violence seeking a new 
home have not been a panacea, however. In the main, too few 
jurisdictions provide for alternative housing in the CPO laws, early 
lease termination, or protection from discrimination. Under the 
CPO laws, only eleven states specifically require the respondent to 
provide alternative housing.147 Often, this option is available only if 
the respondent has a duty to support the petitioner or their children, 
and the shared home is solely owned by respondent.148 The 
alternative housing option under the CPO demonstrates Lorna Fox’s 
position that too often the home is based on a woman’s familial 
relationships rather than her own identity and needs.149 Only two 
states specifically require respondent to pay rent for petitioner’s 
alternative housing.150 Accordingly, the limited availability of the 
alternative housing option undermines supporting a woman’s dignity 
to answer for herself the meaning of her life through development of 
her home. 
For tenants in federally-funded housing, there are more options 
for alternative housing, and they are not linked to women’s familial 
relationships. Under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the 
federal government supports the choice of a tenant who resides in a 
federally-funded public housing unit or receives federally-funded 
housing assistance, such as Section 8 vouchers, who decides to 
transfer or seek reassignment to a different unit if she was subjected 
 
 147. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60 / 214 (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. §19–13–4(a) 
(West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136 (2012); IOWA CODE § 236.5 (2012); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 93-21-15 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40–13–5 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
50B–3 (2012); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36–3–
606 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1–279.1 (2012); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35–21–105 
(2012). 
 148. E.g. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (West 2012). 
 149. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 46 (discussing Fox’s theory that the individual 
female homeowner is invisible and the family as home occupier is highly visible). 
 150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–29 (West 2012) and W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-403 
(West 2012). 
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to domestic violence.151 If she is a private tenant, however, only 
fourteen jurisdictions permit her to terminate her lease early because 
of domestic violence.152 If she is able to terminate her lease early, she 
may have difficulty finding a new home. Prospective private 
landlords may refuse to rent to her in order to avoid any future 
domestic violence on the premises. Such discrimination is possible in 
most jurisdictions as only eight jurisdictions have anti-discrimination 
laws.153 Under VAWA, public housing authorities and Section 8 
landlords cannot deny admission to housing or use of her voucher 
because she is a victim of domestic violence.154 
Women subjected to abuse may have difficulty identifying a new 
home because of the effects of the abuse to which they were 
subjected. Victims of domestic violence often are isolated from 
family, friends, and support networks.155 The isolation can result 
from intentional actions by the abuser or from the woman’s efforts 
to protect herself. As Professor Adele Morrison states, “Secrecy, 
silence and shame are also aspects of the abuse itself. Abusers use 
shame and secrecy as tools to control those they are victimizing.”156 
Professor Beverly Balos has discussed how this resulting isolation is a 
 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(5) (2012). VAWA does not exempt the tenant from liability 
to her Section 8 landlord. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has issued 
policy guidance urging public housing agencies to ensure that tenants are transferred when 
needed because of domestic violence. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK §§ 19.2, 19.4 (2003). 
 152. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33–1318 (LexisNexis 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38–12–
402(2) (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5314 (2012); D.C. CODE § 42–3505.07 
(LexisNexis 2012); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 750 / 15 (LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 32–31–9–12 (LexisNexis 2012); MD. CODE ANN., Real Prop. § 8-5A-02 (LexisNexis 
2012); MINN. STAT. § 504B–205 (2007); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 227–c (Consol. 2012); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42–45.1 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 90.453 (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE 
ANN. § 92.016 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.575 (LexisNexis 2012); and 
WIS. STAT. § 704.16 (2012). 
 153. See D.C. CODE §§ 2–1401.01–.03 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–31–9–12 (West 
2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42–45.1 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.456, .459 
(West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34–37–1 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.580 (West 
2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.1201 (West 2009). LEGAL MOMENTUM, supra note 142 
(identifying eight jurisdictions and Westchester County, NY as having anti-discrimination laws 
protecting domestic violence victims). 
 154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d, 1437f (2012). 
 155. Johnson, supra note 4, at 1119–1121. 
 156. Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)course: Moving from White 
Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1087 (2006). 
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barrier to women subjected to abuse who want to leave the home.157 
A woman isolated from family and friends may have difficulty 
requesting temporary shelter or financial support. Moreover, if 
isolated from the broader community, the woman may have 
difficulty knowing what resources might exist for her, such as 
temporary shelter, money for moving expenses, and access to 
transitional housing. Professor Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol 
explains that “Latinas who suffer domestic violence are less likely 
than other women to contact friends, family, or clergy. The result is 
complete isolation that prevents Latinas from escaping abuse and 
receiving help.”158 
Even if the woman is successful in finding a new home, moving 
to a new home away from the community may exacerbate her 
isolation. For example, many shelters are placed in confidential 
locations and thus can dislocate the woman from her community.159 
Even if separated from her abuser and living in a new home or 
shelter, isolation can increase a woman’s risk of violence. As 
Professors Epstein and Goodman explain, “research shows that 
women in hidden locations are no safer during their stay than 
women in open shelters where community members can participate 
in keeping residents safe.”160 
In addition, women cannot benefit fully from existing laws, 
which permit or encourage them to leave a home shared with a 
violent partner, because women continue to have insufficient 
economic resources to leave the home. One study showed that for 
African American women, “economic dependence on her husband” 
 
 157. Beverly Balos, A Man’s Home is his Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence 
and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 77, 99 (2004). 
 158. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas-Gendered in Justice/Gendered 
Injustice: Latinas, Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 354, 385 (1998) 
(footnote omitted). 
 159. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 102 (citing Haaken and Yragui 2003 
study); SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 59 (1982) (One Puerto Rican advocate stated “‘Puerto 
Rican women who come to the shelter are very scared. They don’t want to leave their 
community and come to a new place. They may have language problems. They don’t drive. 
They may never have paid bills or done a budget. They particularly dislike having to share 
rooms with other people, both black and white women. They have never lived this way before. 
They’re not used to living collectively or sharing apartments like white women do.’”) 
 160. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 102 (citing Haaken and Yragui 2003 
study). 
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was the primary factor causing a return to an abuser.161 Even after 
extricating herself from lease obligations in the shared home, and 
even with protection from housing discrimination, for example, a 
woman who has been abused, like other potential tenants, still needs 
money to actually leave due to moving expenses, first and last 
months’ rents, down-payment on mortgage, deposits for utilities, 
etc. Unlike many other tenants, however, a woman seeking a new 
home because of abuse may have little time to obtain these necessary 
funds.162 If she finds temporary shelter upon leaving the shared 
home, she may have only the length of a shelter stay, often as little as 
fourteen days,163 to accumulate sufficient resources; if she is unable 
to locate emergency shelter, she may need the funds immediately. 
For those women who live in one of the twenty jurisdictions that 
have crime victims’ compensation fund monies that provide explicitly 
for relocation expenses, she may be able to access those funds.164 
 
 161. Cris M. Sullivan & Maureen H. Rumptz, Adjustment and Needs of African-
American Women Who Utilized a Domestic Violence Shelter, 9 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 275, 
276 (1994). 
 162. Id. (“For women who use shelters, however, limited resources often trap them with 
their assailants.”). 
 163. See, e.g., Martin Donohoe, Homelessness in the United States: History, Epidemiology, 
Health Issues, Women, and Public Policy, MEDSCAPE, (July 7, 2004), 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/481800 (“Average length of stay at a US shelter is 14 
days; most allow a 30-day maximum stay.”). 
 164. Alabama (moving expenses, security deposits and utilities): ALA. CODE § 15–23–15 
(1998); ALA. CRIME VICTIMS’ COMP. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.acvcc.state.al.us/downloads/annualreport2011.pdf; California (relocation): CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 13957 (West 2010); Victim Comp. and Gov’t Claims Bd., What’s Covered, 
CA.GOV, http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/victims/coverage.aspx (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); 
Delaware (temporary housing, relocation expenses, mortgage and rent payments): DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, § 9006 (West 2009); Del. Victims’ Comp. Assistance Program, Compensation 
Program, http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/VCAP/compensation.htm (last visited Nov. 
6, 2013); District of Columbia (temporary shelter, first month’s rent and moving expenses): 
D.C. CODE § 4-507 (2000); SUPER. CT. OF THE DIST. OF COLUM., supra note 44; Florida 
(relocation expenses): FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.198 (West 2012); Illinois (relocation, including 
temporary lodging, rent, security deposit and moving van and storage): ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 740 § 45 / 10.1 (West 2013); OFFICE OF THE ILL. ATT’Y GEN., CRIME VICTIM 
COMPENSATION: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, available at 
http://www.ag.state.il.us/victims/CV_FAQ_0113.pdf; Indiana (shelter expenses): IND. 
CODE ANN. § 5–2-6.1–21 (West 2009); Kansas (moving expenses): KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74–
7305 (West 2011); CRIME VICTIMS COMP. BD., ANNUAL REPORT, available at 
http://ag.ks.gov/docs/documents/crime-victims-compensation-board-annual-report-
2012.pdf?sfvrsn=6; Maryland (rent, utility bills or relocation expenses): MD. CODE. ANN., 
Crim. Proc. § 11–810 (West 2004); CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, DEP’T OF 
PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, (2003), available at 
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Unfortunately, those monies do not exist in the majority 
of jurisdictions. 
Many victims of physical, psychological, or emotional abuse are 
also subjected to various forms of economic abuse, potentially 
exacerbating the financial crisis in which a woman may find herself 
when seeking a new home. Financial abuse may include actions by 
the abuser that damage the woman’s credit rating, sabotage her 
employment, require her to turn over any income earned to her 
partner, or exclude her from access to family monies.165 As a result of 
the abuse, the petitioner’s work, credit, and financial records may be 
poor. Therefore, landlords and mortgage companies may refuse to 
rent or loan money to her for housing.166 
But access to short-term housing options, such as shelters167 and 
transitional housing,168 are not just limited by a woman’s economic 
 
http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/publicinfo/publications/pdfs/CICB2004AnnRpt.pdf; 
Mississippi (relocation and temporary housing assistance): Miss. Code. Ann. § 99–41–5 (West 
2012); Nevada (shelter and relocation costs): NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.090 (West 1991); 
Dep’t of Admin., Victims of Crime, VOCP Benefits and Covered Expenses, NV.GOV, 
http://voc.nv.gov/VOC/Covered_Expenses/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); New Hampshire 
(relocation expenses): N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21–M:8–h (2013); ST. OF N.H. VICTIMS’ 
COMP. PROGRAM, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARE YOU A VICTIM OF CRIME, available at 
http://doj.nh.gov/grants-management/victims-compensation-
program/documents/brochure.pdf; New Jersey (moving expenses, first month’s rent, security 
deposit, temporary shelter): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B–9 (West 2007); Victims of Crime 
Comp. Office, Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, Eligibility Requirements, NJ.GOV, 
http://www.nj.gov/oag/njvictims/eligibility.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013); New York 
(shelter and moving expenses): N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 525.12 (McKinney 2011); Office of Victim 
Servs., Compensation, NY.GOV, http://www.ovs.ny.gov/services/VictimCompensation.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2013); Pennsylvania (relocation expenses): 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11.103 
(West 2005); Tennessee (moving expenses, storage fees and utility transfer fees): TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 29–13–106(a)(7) (West 2012); Texas (one-time relocation expenses, including rent, 
utilities, moving expenses): TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.42 (West 2003); Utah 
(relocation expenses): UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M–7–511 (West 2011); UTAH OFFICE FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME: CRIME VICTIM REPARATIONS PROGRAM, ARE YOU A VICTIM OF A 
CRIME, available at http://www.crimevictim.state
.ut.us/Documents/Crime%20Victim%20Information/CrimeVictimBrochure_2011.pdf; 
Vermont (rent, relocation and temporary living expenses): VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5356 
(West 2008); VT. CTR. FOR CRIME VICTIM SERVS.: VICTIMS COMP. PROGRAM, HAS YOUR 
LIFE BEEN AFFECTED BY CRIME?, available at 
http://www.ccvs.state.vt.us/sites/default/files/resources/VCCVSAffected%20
by%20Crime.pdf; Virginia (reasonable moving expenses): VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–368.11:1 
(West 2008). 
 165. GOODMARK, supra note 26, at 42–43; Johnson, supra note 4, at 1115–24. 
 166. Lapidus, supra note 80, at 385. 
 167. For example, in Washington, D.C. there are ninety-six shelter beds that provide 
twenty- to thirty-day stays on average. In addition, there is available emergency shelter in local 
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means. Such housing options are also limited by the public funding 
for them. Routinely, public funding is high for the criminal justice 
response to domestic violence and much lower for housing. For 
example, the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $189 
million for STOP grants,169 monies which fund the criminal justice 
system’s response to domestic violence.170 The STOP grants budget 
has remained at the same level since 2010.171 The Act provided only 
$18 million for transitional housing assistance grants in 2010.172 
 
hotels for an average of three nights. The emergency shelter offered 375 adults and 
approximately 700 children shelter in 2011. DC SAFE, Statistics, DCSAFE.ORG, 
http://dcsafe.org/domestic-violence-info/statistics/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). Yet when 
one compares the numbers of persons able to be served to the 5,401 persons seeking domestic 
violence assistance by visiting the Domestic Violence Intake Center in Washington, D.C., it 
becomes clear that the number of people sheltered is inadequate. DC SAFE, supra. 
 168. For example, DASH, a nonprofit focusing on safe housing in Washington, D.C., has 
doubled the number of transitional housing units to 43. Dist. Alliance for Safe Housing, 
Programs & Services, http://www.dashdc.org /programs-services/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2013). That still is far fewer units than needed for the large percentage of the 5401 persons 
who visit the Domestic Violence Intake Center in DC and need housing. See DC SAFE, supra 
note 167 and author’s personal experience with the clients her clinic students represent. 
 169. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, FY 2013 
APPROPRIATIONS BRIEFING BOOK 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.nnedv.org/docs/Policy/FY_13_Briefing_Book.pdf (STOP grants for law 
enforcement agencies and prosecutor offices). 
 170. Stoever, supra note 26, at 305 n.3 (stating that criminal justice response, and 
especially encouraging arrest policies, were “by far the largest category” of STOP funding). 
The Department of Justice explains that “the STOP Program promotes a coordinated, 
multidisciplinary approach to enhancing advocacy and improving the criminal justice system’s 
response to violent crimes against women. It encourages the development and improvement of 
effective law enforcement and prosecution strategies to address violent crimes against women 
and the development and improvement of advocacy and services in cases involving violent 
crimes against women.” Office on Violence Against Women, US Dep’t of Justice, Grant 
Programs, USDOJ.GOV http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/ovwgrantprograms.htm#17 (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2013). As stated on the Michigan Department of Human Resources website, victim 
service programs are allocated 30% of the STOP grants as opposed to the criminal justice 
system, which received 50%. Specifically, the website states, “The federal STOP Violence 
Against Women program requires communities to show how it will allocate at least 25% of the 
grant to law enforcement, 25% to prosecution, 5% to courts, and 30% to victim services 
programs. The remaining 15% may be spent in any way the group decides is appropriate, but it 
must conform to the federal grant guidelines.” Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., STOP Violence 
Against Women Grants, MICHIGAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/dhs/0,4562,7-124-
7119_7261_7272-15062 —,00.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
 171. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 
169, at 6. 
 172. Id. The Transitional Housing Assistance Program seeks to provide “holistic, victim-
centered” support services that move individuals into permanent housing. Office on Violence 
Against Women, supra note 170. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/5/2014 3:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
42 
While the allocation for transitional housing increased to 25 million 
in 2012,173 President Obama requested $3 million less for 2013 
transitional housing funding.174 The Family Violence Prevention and 
Services Act, which provides money for domestic violence shelters 
along with counseling and hotline services, provided $130 million in 
2010.175 President Obama’s proposed budget for FY 2013 is 
$135 million.176 
Even with the funding provided,177 local shelters and transitional 
housing still turn away tens of thousands of persons subjected to 
abuse each year.178 In 2009, although able to serve over one million 
victims of domestic violence, shelters denied 167,069 requests due 
to lack of capacity.179 Sixteen domestic violence shelters closed in 
2009.180 And in just one day in 2011, while 5,149 adults and 7,551 
children were in transitional housing, 2,629 persons’ requests for 
transitional housing were denied because of a lack of available 
units.181 Similarly, in just one day in 2011, 10,581 requests for 
 
 173. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 
169, at 6. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 7. 
 176. Id. 
 177. It is important to note that there are other federal housing assistance programs such 
as the Housing and Urban Development’s McKinney-Vento Supportive Housing Program, 
state departments of social services, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. See Alyse 
Faye Haugen, Comment, When it Rains it Pours: The Violence Against Women Act’s Failure to 
Provide Shelter From the Storm of Domestic Violence, 14 SCHOLAR 1035, 1063 n.138 (2012). 
 178. Nat’l Coalition Against Domestic Violence, State Facts, NCADV.ORG 
http://www.ncadv.org/resources/FactSheets.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). For instance, 
“[i]n 2007, 8,324 men, women and children were turned away from shelters in Missouri 
because they were full.” NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MISSOURI 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/Missouri%202.09.pdf. 
In addition, “[i]n 2006, 10,131 adults and 12,076 children were turned away from [New 
York] shelters due to lack of space.” NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS: NEW YORK, available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/New
%20York%20new%202.09.pdf. In Colorado, the lack of affordable housing makes it difficult 
for victims to transition from shelters to permanent residences and therefore, if possible, 
victims request to extend their shelter times. NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS: COLORADO, available at 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/Colorado%20revised%202.09.pdf. See also Haugen, supra note 
177, at 1057. 
 179. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra 
note169, at 20. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
 181. Id. at 20. 
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shelter and other nonresidential services were denied because of a 
lack of resources.182 
For those women able to enter the shelters, the maximum stay is 
often thirty days.183 Locating permanent housing can take six months 
or longer, however.184 Due to the shortage of alternative housing, 
women who would otherwise reside apart from an abusive partner 
often are unable to do so.185 
Even fewer options are available for men, transgendered 
persons,186 persons with disabilities, and women who have limited 
English proficiency.187 Shelters are not always able to accommodate 
dietary, religious, or cultural differences.188 Restrictions as to the 
number and ages of children also serve as barriers to shelter entry for 
women with large families.189Women who suffer from mental illness 
and substance abuse are often screened out at a shelter’s intake 
as well.190 
 
 182. Id. at 4. 
 183. Ashley Lowe & Sarah R. Prout, Economic Justice in Domestic Violence Litigation, 
MICH. B.J., Sept. 2011, at 32, 33. The average stay is sixty days in an emergency homeless 
shelter. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 
169, at 20. 
 184. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra 
note169, at 20; Lowe & Prout, supra note 183, at 33. 
 185. CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 
169, at 20; Lowe & Prout, supra note 183, at 33. 
 186. See Goodmark, supra note 4. 
 187. Jessica H. Stein, Coalition, Cross-Cultural Lawyering, and Intersectionality: 
Immigrant Identity as a Barrier to Effective Legal Counseling for Domestic Violence Victims, 11 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 133, 154 (2011) (“Issues with shelter, language, and food, for instance, 
cause victims to return to their abusers even if they were able to leave initially.”); Hernandez-
Truyol, supra note 158, at 385 (describing the barrier to Latinas in English-only policies, 
which result from the absence of Spanish speaking staff). 
 188. See, e.g., Nooria Faizi, Domestic Violence in the Muslim Community, 10 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. 209, 219 (2001) (explaining that Muslim women do not feel comfortable in 
“western” shelters because of the cultural, religious and dietary differences); Felicia E. Franco, 
Unconditional Safety for Conditional Immigrant Women, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 99, 
125–26 (1996) (explaining the impact of cultural and religious differences on Asian and Latina 
immigrants); Sharon Stapel, Falling to Pieces: New York State Civil Legal Remedies Available to 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Survivors of Domestic Violence, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. 
REV. 247, 264 (2007–2008) (explaining that domestic violence shelters “often do not provide 
appropriate services for LGBT survivors”); Stein, supra note 187, at 154. 
 189. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 158, at 385 (identifying such policies as barriers to 
Latinas who may have large families). 
 190. Louisa Gilbert, Mainstream Legal Responses to Domestic Violence vs. Real Needs of 
Diverse Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13, 46 (2001) (“I do not know of one domestic 
violence shelter in New York City that serves women who report current drug use.”); Hilary 
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Another shortcoming to relying on shelters as a new home for 
women subjected to abuse is that women find certain shelters 
increasingly inhospitable, even hostile, environments. Initially, 
shelters operated on empowerment-oriented, feminist models.191 For 
instance, shelters recognized domestic violence as systemic in nature, 
and expressly provided domestic violence services within a larger 
context of gender oppression.192 As government funding became 
available for shelters, however, funding requirements led shelters to 
approach domestic violence as an individualized problem, rather than 
a manifestation of shared, societal concerns. Today, shelters 
increasingly focus on interventions and treatments for the women 
staying in the shelter, such as requiring them to apply for 
government benefits and substance abuse and therapeutic 
counseling.193 As Susan Schechter points out, shelter residents are 
subjected often to onerous bureaucratic rules.194 Shelters also 
sometimes impose on mothers prescribed parenting practices, and 
insist that women have no contact with their batterers.195 These 
requirements and restrictions may cause women to refrain from 
entering shelters or to leave shelters abruptly. 
Finally, another shortcoming to creating a new home at a shelter 
is that the shelter stay itself does not necessarily stop the violence. 
One study showed that ten weeks after a shelter stay, 46% of women 
continued to experience domestic violence. 196 
 
Mattis, California’s Survivors of Domestic Violence Employment Leave Act: The Twenty-Five 
Employee Minimum Is Not A Good Rule of Thumb, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1319, 1326–27 
(2010) (“Some domestic violence shelters also turn away particularly vulnerable women, such 
as homeless women and women with drug or alcohol addiction.”). 
 191. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 93; SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 63. 
 192. SCHECHTER, supra note 44. 
 193. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN IN PERSONAL 
LIFE 76 (2007) (citing a 1993 study finding that of 379 advocacy programs, the majority 
“emphasized counseling, information, and referral, meeting immediate needs for clothing or 
shelter, helping women get protection orders, and other direct services rather than systems 
change, although many understood that structured change was a precondition for effective 
help.”); KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED 
THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 70–71 (2008). 
 194. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 93; SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 63. 
 195. BUMILLER, supra note 193, at 131 (“Social workers acquired a mandate to eradicate 
intimate violence through the treatment of victims rather than focusing on solutions that 
would require changing the behavior of perpetrators.”). 
 196. Sullivan & Rumptz, supra note 161, at 281. 
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D. Chooses to End Violence and Stay with Respondent in Home 
For the petitioner who chooses to end the violence but stay with 
her intimate partner in the home there are few legal remedies. The 
paucity of options is a result of the legal system’s limited goal of 
short-term safety through physical separation that was discussed 
above. If an individual wishes to end the abuse but stay in her 
relationship, all of the options focused on physical separation do not 
meet her goal. Other choices are scarce. As a result, the legal system 
has not created as many choices as possible to support an individual 
in this position and thus support her dignity to have a shared home 
and decrease domestic violence. 
1. CPO no further abuse provision 
CPO laws generally permit a petitioner to seek an order 
enjoining the abuser from future abusive conduct without also 
seeking an order directing the abuser to leave the home or refrain 
from contact with the victim.197 Accordingly, in most states, civil 
protection order laws permit a person subjected to abuse to stay in 
the shared home with the abusive partner, including while 
continuing their relationship. In a few jurisdictions, however, the 
CPO law does not permit a petitioner to seek a “no abuse” order 
without ending her relationship with the partner who abused her.198 
2. Benefits 
A woman subjected to abuse might choose to stay in the home 
and continue her relationship with the person who abused her for a 
wide range of reasons.199 Attuned to her partner’s personality and 
predilections, the person may believe that the violence will decrease 
if the relationship continues. Some studies show that this does 
happen.200 The emotional connection she feels to her intimate 
 
 197. MD. CODE ANN., Family Law § 4–506 (West 2012). 
 198. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: 
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 
1504 n.110 (2008) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–28.1 (establishing that no protection 
order can be granted that would permit respondent to share the premises with petitioner)); 
Stoever, supra note 26, at 333. 
 199. Goldfarb, supra note 198, at 1520–21. 
 200. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 98 (showing that safety can increase while 
continuing the relationship with person who had committed the abuse in the past). 
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partner may be strong, despite the abuse,201 or she may want the 
family to stay united in one home if there are children.202 She may be 
concerned about her financial viability or the loss of community ties 
if she separates.203 Moreover, the person may be concerned that 
violence will increase if she ends the relationship, leaves the home, or 
forces the abusive partner to do so.204 Similarly, she may be choosing 
to avoid future psychological harm that would result from separation 
violence.205 Finally, as discussed above, women can be empowered 
by tailoring a remedy to their own, individual situation.206 
3. Shortcomings 
As discussed above, there is only one law that specifically permits 
women to remain in a shared home with the abusive partner while 
ending the violence. This “no further abuse” provision of CPO laws 
does not, however, comprehensively address the needs presented by 
the situation. For example, these CPO laws do not direct provision of 
financial assistance to maintain the home or address the woman’s 
economic or isolated situation, if present. And while no crime victims’ 
compensation law explicitly provides for rental or mortgage assistance 
for a victim who does not relocate, one jurisdiction, West Virginia, 
explicitly discourages payment of any monies that would benefit a 
respondent if the victim continues to live with him.207 CPO laws do 
not also contain provisions that address a woman’s agency while in the 
 
 201. GOODMARK, supra note 26, at 96–101 (2012) (discussing love); Martha R. 
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (1989); Stoever, supra note 26, at 331–32. 
 202. Mahoney, supra note 201, at 17. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Stoever, supra note 26, at 332. 
 205. Id. (discussing that women who are abused may be staying in relationships that have 
been abusive in order to avoid “future threats of violence, as well as the psychological 
consequences of trauma, which include post-traumatic stress symptoms such as hyper-vigilance 
and anxiety-producing flashbacks of the violence”) (citing SONDRA BURMAN, COGNITIVE 
PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY AND STAGES OF CHANGE THAT FACILITATE AND SUSTAIN 
BATTERED WOMEN’S LEAVING, IN BATTERED WOMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES 33, 44 (Albert 
R. Roberts ed., 3d ed. 2007)). 
 206. Johnson, supra note 30, at 571. 
 207. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14–2A–1 (West 2012) (“The extent to which a payment to a 
victim will support the offender by paying for the offender’s living expenses, including food, 
shelter, clothing, or entertainment, or the extent to which the payment will substitute for 
money that the offender otherwise normally would expend for the benefit of the household or 
its members, so as to avoid unjust enrichment of the offender.”). 
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home—such as explicitly protecting or supporting a woman’s agency 
to maintain relationships with family and friends as well as to maintain 
or seek employment. 
The effectiveness of laws that permit women to remain in a shared 
home with an abusive partner is hamstrung by the ambivalence of 
system actors about the appropriateness of this remedy. Such 
ambivalence undermines the dignity of women subjected to abuse as 
well as men who have perpetrated abuse. As noted earlier, civil and 
criminal justice system responses to domestic violence are premised on 
physical separation as the key to safety. Thus, lawyers, judges, 
courtroom clerks, and advocates may not inform women that this 
option is available, or may discourage the choice208 by berating or 
verbalizing frustration with a woman’s choice to stay with her partner 
who had abused her.209 Judges sometimes disbelieve women who 
testify that they were abused and who also seek to stay in a shared 
home with the abuser, finding the desire to stay impossibly 
irreconcilable with the experience of abuse.210 As a result, persons 
subjected to abuse may not actually be able to actualize their choice—
or may be reluctant to exercise it. Such undermining of agency and 
dignity can actually increase women’s risk of future violence.211 
III. PROPOSAL: A HOME WITH DIGNITY EVEN AMIDST DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
As discussed above in Part II, obstacles in the current legal 
landscape to owning or maintaining a home for women subjected to 
abuse and men who abuse may increase domestic violence. These 
obstacles are embedded in the current legal system’s narrow, ill-
defined goals, the actual laws themselves, and their attached 
funding schemes. 
A. Current Obstacles 
First, an important obstacle to owning and maintaining a home 
and ending domestic violence is the fact that the connection between 
 
 208. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 98. 
 209. Stoever, supra note 26, at 336–41. 
 210. Id. at 336. 
 211. See Gist, supra note 24; Tamara Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: 
Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 91–94 (2009). 
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home control and ending domestic violence is underdeveloped. This 
obstacle is explained in part by Lorna Fox’s theory of the invisibility 
of women as single home owners and occupiers. As a result, women 
subjected to abuse have a limited ability to maintain their home or 
obtain a new home without being a spouse or having children with 
her abuser. Contributing to this result is the low court rate of issuing 
vacate orders against respondents, regardless of respondents’ 
ownership interests in the home.212 Also, the limited number of 
jurisdictions that offer exclusion and stay away from the home orders 
against respondent while also granting petitioner exclusive possession 
makes it difficult for women subjected to abuse to control their own 
home. And because few jurisdictions provide lock-change rights, 
eviction defense protection, CPO alternative housing options, 
financial assistance for housing, and anti-discrimination laws there 
are even fewer opportunities for women subjected to abuse to 
maintain their own home. This obstacle can undermine petitioners’ 
dignity, such as their personal development, expression of their 
individuality, their bodily health and integrity, their emotions, their 
affiliation with others and their control over their environment. The 
obstacle in maintaining their home or obtaining a new home also 
thwarts women’s agency, further increasing their risk of violence. 
Second, many laws that promote separation as the only option to 
ending domestic violence. This obstacle is often grounded in a belief 
that violence is short-term and can be stopped by establishing 
physical barriers. This obstacle is also often bounded in a black and 
white view of domestic violence—that it is either egregious or not 
present and that a person subjected to domestic violence is either a 
victim and lacks agency or is a survivor and demonstrates her agency 
by leaving. The laws that promote separation rarely permit a woman 
subjected to abuse to choose to stay in the relationship and home 
but end the violence. As a result, the laws often undercut both 
parties’ dignity by failing to respect their intimate associations and a 
woman’s choice to control her environment. 
Third, many jurisdictions vacate respondents from their solely-
owned homes without consideration of their attachment to the 
property or their alternative living arrangements. Moreover, there is 
no system in place to provide alternative homes for men who are 
abusive, such as shelters. As a result, the law does not support 
 
 212. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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respondents’ dignity as it does not consider respondents’ home and 
how it interplays with respondents’ development and expression of 
their individuality, their affiliation with their neighbors and 
community members, and their control over their environment. 
Most vacate remedies do not require more proof than the abuse 
committed by respondent against an intimate partner in order to 
exclude him from the home. As a result, the law does not provide 
respondents a voice in the vacate process and respondents may view 
this as unfair. Such unfairness can also result in diminished 
compliance with protective orders and increased violence. 
What we see from these obstacles is that the home is critical, the 
choice of which home is critical, and the support for the home is 
critical for dignity and overcoming the obstacles to ending domestic 
violence. Therefore, I propose that our legal system reconceive how 
best to create or maintain a home for both parties. The legal system 
response to domestic violence could eradicate many of these 
obstacles if it were guided by the value of supporting dignity, which 
is integrally connected to having a home and ending 
domestic violence. 
B. Feminist Domestic Violence Movement Should Focus More on 
Dignity and Greater Home Access 
The feminist domestic violence movement could play an 
important role in transforming the current legal system response to 
domestic violence, which is currently focused on a narrow concept of 
safety premised on physical separation in the home. The movement 
could work towards improving domestic violence laws, policy, and 
funding decisions to reflect a broader, comprehensive focus on 
dignity. Focusing on the value of dignity could invigorate the 
concept of home and promote the goal of ending domestic violence, 
rather than merely containing or responding to its outbreaks of 
violence. As discussed earlier in this Article, supporting dignity 
includes supporting such human capacities as life; bodily health; 
bodily integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over 
one’s environment.213 
 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
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The first obstacle to the legal system ending domestic violence 
identified above is that the legal system misunderstands the 
connection between home control and ending domestic violence. As 
seen in the case study of low-income Puerto Rican women, 
maintaining their home or obtaining a new home was critical to the 
cessation of domestic violence.214 This is true even if the women 
chose to stay in their relationships.215 Susan Schechter aptly 
identified the need for an expanded focus for the feminist domestic 
violence movement to focus beyond domestic violence as individual 
problems rather than collective ones and to connect battering to 
“the larger struggle to free women from oppression . . . [and to] 
other political struggles.”216This expanded focus could include added 
support for the dignity of women subjected to abuse. Accordingly, 
the movement could highlight the importance of supporting 
women’s dignity by expanding to more jurisdictions helpful laws 
(such as vacate laws with exclusive possession to petitioner) and to 
ensure that the law on the books (such as the CPO vacate law) is 
actually effectuated in reality. 
The second obstacle discussed above is the legal system’s heavy 
focus on separation and short-term options for women subjected to 
abuse. With a renewed focus on dignity, the feminist community 
could explore the importance of the woman’s connection to and 
relationship with her partner and her community and its ability to 
support her, and thereby enrich the personhood stake in her home. 
If dignity were the overriding value in domestic violence law and 
policy, resources could be redistributed to provide more funding for 
shelters, transitional housing, and alternative housing promoting a 
stable home to balance out the heavy emphasis and funding of the 
criminal justice system responses to domestic violence. The enlarged 
focus would create a more nuanced meaning of safety, so that 
separation and sole possession of the home would not be the only 
ways to end domestic violence, and indeed could be recognized as 
threatening safety in some circumstances. Focusing on dignity could 
help ensure that shelter housing is not the end of the process for 
finding a home, and instead expand the options for long-term home 
options as well. And focusing on dignity would recognize and 
 
 214. See supra text accompanying note 75. 
 215. Id. 
 216. SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 252. 
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support the woman’s rationality, practical decision making, 
emotions, and intimate associations, including decisions to stay in 
the relationship and shared home and attempt to end the violence. 
The third obstacle discussed above is that the legal system 
unfairly undermines the dignity of men who abuse women. Rather 
than exploring how best to allocate the home when there is domestic 
violence, the vast majority of jurisdictions vacate a respondent 
regardless of his sole-ownership of his home and without any inquiry 
into his attachment to the home or his alternative housing options. 
Once found to have committed abuse, most CPO laws permit a 
vacate order without further proof. As a result, respondent is denied 
a voice in the process of determining who shall have access to which 
home. If the feminist domestic violence movement could focus more 
on dignity—including the dignity of men who abuse—there could 
be a focus on giving voice to the men. The focus on dignity will 
further the goal of ending domestic violence. Under the theory of 
procedural justice, if the legal system provides an opportunity for 
each party to voice their concerns about an issue, there will be 
greater compliance with the final order. In addition, given the 
concerns courts have made regarding the lack of a voice for 
respondents, if there is a chance for respondents to voice their 
attachment to and need for a home, perhaps more courts will vacate 
respondents when necessary because the courts will feel the system 
is fairer. 
C. Focused on Dignity, the Domestic Violence Movement May More 
Effectively End Abuse in the Home 
With a greater focus on dignity, the feminist domestic violence 
movement may spawn effective reform to end domestic violence in 
homes. As discussed above, our current legal system does not 
adequately address both parties’ need for a home when there is 
domestic violence. As a result, the goal of ending domestic violence 
and each party’s dignity are undermined. Focusing on dignity, and 
the connection between supporting human being’s capabilities, 
advocates can argue for new laws that could address the right to a 
home when there is domestic violence. Below are two ideas for legal 
change to tackle the obstacles addressed in this Article. 
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1. Expand criteria for home possession based on goals of ending domestic 
violence, supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of home 
One legislative proposal is to expand the criteria for determining 
home possession. For CPO vacate laws, rather than considering 
simply whether the petitioner or respondent should remain in the 
home based on whether or not there was abuse, the law should use a 
series of factors that would honor all of the competing values, such 
as fairness, property interests, economic resources, community 
connection, ending domestic violence, and the benefits of home. In 
allocating property rights to shared homes, courts should weigh the 
petitioner’s interest in ending domestic violence, the court’s finding 
that respondent committed abuse against petitioner, the woman’s 
agency, the property interests in the home held by each party, each 
party’s personhood interest in the home, and each party’s connection 
to and reliance upon the community in which the home is located. 
In addition, the court could be ordered to consider the family 
relationships that exist between the petitioner and respondent, as 
well as whether there are any minor children. Finally, the court 
should consider the economic resources held by each party, the 
access to alternative housing for each party, and the duration of the 
order that would exclude the party from the home. The vacate 
provisions themselves should list all of these factors to be weighed, 
and identify the guiding values of ending domestic violence, 
supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of home. 
Although four jurisdictions currently have a factor analysis built 
into their property-allocation provision, the factors are more limited 
than those proposed here.217 In addition, these jurisdictions do not 
provide any guidance for why the criteria were selected or how to 
weigh the factors.218 A textured analysis of these factors may avoid 
 
 217. ARIZ. R. PROTECTIVE ORDER PROC. R. 6 C.5.b; 750 ILCS 60/214 (b) (Ill.); MD. 
CODE ANN., Fam. Law § 4–506(h); and NDCC, 14–07.1-08 (N.D.). Under MD. CODE 
ANN., Family Law § 4-506(h) (2012), the factors are: “(1) the housing needs of any minor 
child living in the home; (2) the duration of the relationship between the respondent and any 
person eligible for relief; (3) title to the home; (4) pendency and type of criminal charges 
against the respondent; (5) the history and severity of abuse in the relationship between the 
respondent and any person eligible for relief; (6) the existence of alternative housing for the 
respondent and any person eligible for relief; and (7) the financial resources of the respondent 
and the person eligible for relief.” 
 218. PROTECTIVE ORDER R. 6 C.5.b; 750 ILCS 60 / 214 (b) (Ill.); § 4–506(h); and 
NDCC, 14–07.1-08. 
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court decisions, for example, that attempt to overcome the fairness 
concern raised by vacating a respondent from solely-owned property 
by weighing respondent’s property interests more heavily than 
deserved given the respondent’s connection to the property. 
2. Increase the number of home options based on goals of ending 
domestic violence, supporting dignity, and affirming the importance of 
home 
Another legislative proposal consistent with a focus on dignity is 
increasing the number of home options. For instance, vacate laws 
should focus not only on which party will have exclusive or shared 
possessory rights to the home, but also should ensure that such 
decisions result in a suitable and stable home for each party. Neither 
party should become homeless, lose contact with her or his 
personhood property, or become dislocated from her or his 
community. For instance, if respondent is able to maintain exclusive 
possession of the shared residence after the CPO, the vacate laws 
should provide a mechanism for petitioner to obtain funds from 
respondent (if available) for alternative housing as a petitioner may 
do in New Jersey and West Virginia or she should be provided an 
alternative home, if the respondent can provide one, as is permitted 
in ten jurisdictions. Similarly, if petitioner is granted exclusive 
possessory rights over the home, the vacate laws should provide a 
remedy of obtaining funds from the respondent to assist petitioner in 
necessary household expenses, such as the rent, mortgage, utilities, 
and real estate taxes, if he is able to afford it. In addition, all 
jurisdictions should have early lease termination laws and anti-
discrimination laws for domestic violence victims to make finding a 
new home for the person subjected to abuse a real option. 
In addition, private and public support for shelters and low-
barrier housing should be increased for persons subjected to abuse to 
ensure that there are housing options beyond the shared home that 
would not only support the agency, dignity, and safety of the 
petitioner but also the respondent (by staying in the shared 
residence) as well. For example, the Alaska public housing agency 
recently began a new program that provides displaced victims of 
domestic violence with thirty-six months of rental assistance.219 
 
 219. ALASKA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 3 (2012), 
available at http://www.ahfc.us/iceimages/rental/empowering_choice_housing_mou.pdf. 
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Recently, there have been positive developments in lowering barriers 
to shelters and transitional housing,220 and these improvements 
should continue to make this housing more accessible and livable for 
persons subjected to abuse in a way that permits them to be 
connected to the community and even their partner if they so wish. 
Increased housing options also could preclude both parties from 
becoming homeless as a result of the domestic violence. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the legal system does not appropriately address all of the 
issues that are critical to supporting each party’s need for a home. As 
a result of this deficit, domestic violence may be exacerbated, the 
parties may become homeless, and the parties’ dignity is diminished. 
This problem results from the legal system’s limited goals for the 
system—achieving a narrow view of short-term safety premised on 
physical separation in the home. I argue for creating a 
comprehensive theory that addresses the rights to a home when 
there is domestic violence by focusing on each party’s dignity, the 
importance of home, and ending domestic violence. My proposal for 
supporting the dignity of each party in these situations is to have the 
feminist domestic violence movement focus more on dignity and 
greater access to a home. The goal of this focus would be to 
advocate for system change and new and expanded laws. Legislative 
changes could include creating factors to guide the vacate decision 
and to increase the number of housing options for both women 
subjected to abuse and men who perpetrate abuse. 
 
 
 
 
 220. DIST. ALLIANCE FOR SAFE HOUS., supra note 168. 
